Labor Violence: The Inadequate Response of the Federal Anti-Extortion Statutes by Haggard, Thomas R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 2
1980
Labor Violence: The Inadequate Response of the
Federal Anti-Extortion Statutes
Thomas R. Haggard
University of South Carolina School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Thomas R. Haggard, Labor Violence: The Inadequate Response of the Federal Anti-Extortion Statutes, 59 Neb. L. Rev. (1980)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol59/iss4/2
By Thomas R. Haggard*
Labor Violence: The Inadequate
Response of the Federal Anti-
Extortion Statutes0
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all kinds of human conduct, physical violence against person
or property is undoubtedly the one which receives almost univer-
sal condemnation among civilized peoples. Even the fiercest of the
classical liberals and modem libertarians, who view government's
function very narrowly, recognize both the propriety and the ne-
cessity of state sanctions against aggression. Indeed, this may
even be viewed as the only truly essential function of government,
the nonperformance of which divests a corporated body of any le-
gitimate claims to be our political sovereign. The state's control of
violence is, in short, a very important matter.
Labor violence, however, has long been a major problem in this
country. Perhaps the earliest reported instance of labor violence
occurred in 1799 in connection with a strike among the cordwainers
of Philadelphia. It involved numerous acts of misconduct, includ-
ing the throwing of a tack-studded potato through a shop window,
barely missing the head of the proprietor who had hired a
"scab"'-a quaint but lethal way of making a point! The fifty-year
period between 1880 and 1930 was especially marked by acts of vio-
lence commited in connection with the many strikes and lockouts
of that era, which often took on the dimensions of "small wars."
'2
In one two-year period, 1902-04, approximately 200 people were re-
ported killed and over 2,000 injured in acts of labor violence.3
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Although the days of company "armies" and the Molly
McGuires 4 are thankfully gone, acts of violence continue to occur
in labor disputes in this country. No hard data exists concerning
the current scope and origin of this violence. It would appear, how-
ever, that when management opposition to unionization does go
beyond the bounds permitted by law, it consists mainly of eco-
nomic reprisals against union sympathizers,5 although physical vi-
olence by management officials does occur occasionally.6
Violence appears to be a more extensive problem for the House
of Labor. In some instances, it undoubtedly represents the "semi-
official" policy of a labor union, a deliberate and all too effective
tool for bargaining or organizing. In other instances, the official
dereliction consists merely of a more-or-less passive indifference
to the use of violence by rank-and-fie members, including the fail-
ure by union leaders to take steps to prevent and correct these
"unauthorized" acts. Also, there are still other instances of indi-
vidual worker violence committed in open defiance of official and
genuine union prohibitions against it. This conduct is of as much
concern to responsible labor leaders as it is to the victims them-
selves.
At first glance it would appear that the law has responded fully
and adequately to the problem of labor union violence. Such con-
duct is actionable under both the criminal7 and the civil laws of
every state,8 and stiff penalties and high damage awards are cer-
tainly possible. 9 In addition, the federal Labor Management Rela-
4. The Molly McGuires, the name of a group whose formal existence is a matter
of some historical dispute, is generally used to refer to the Irish miners who
engaged in widespread acts of violence, sabotage and murder in the eastern
Pennsylvania coal fields during the bitter strikes of the 1870's. See generally
S. LENS, supra note 2, at 11-35.
5. This kind of conduct, of course, constitutes an unfair labor practice. Labor
Management Relations Act §§ 8(a) (1), (a) (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (a) (3)
(1976).
6. The section 8(a) (1) prohibition against employer interference, restraint, or
coercion of employees in the exercise of their statutory rights is certainly
broad enough to also encompass acts of physical violence or intimidation.
See, e.g., Jacques Syl Knitwear, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 191 (1980). In 1979, how-
ever, only nine violations of this kind were found by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
7. Such things as assault and battery, riot, burnings, and trespass against land
and chattels, all of which can easily occur within the context of a labor dis-
pute, are routinely prohibited by the criminal codes of the various states. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE §§ 16-3-620, -5-70 to -140, -11-120 (1976).
8. See Comment, Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 10 U.
MICH. J.L REF. 517 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1974); C.E.
Thurston & Sons, Inc. v. Barber, 78 LR.R.M. 2719 (M.D.N.C. 1971).
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tions Act regards such violence as an unfair labor practice.10
Although the use of injunctions is prohibited in the context of most
labor disputes, the statutes seem to recognize an exception with
respect to violence.' Furthermore, there are numerous other stat-
utes, both state12 and federal,13 which either specifically or gener-
ally include labor violence within their ambit, or which have the
potential of doing so. 14
Despite the plethora of state and federal laws which potentially
touch on the matter, the problem of labor union violence seems to
persist. Even with due recognition that the law can never be ex-
pected to eradicate completely man's tendency toward aggression
or to always provide a full measure of justice to its victims, the
uneasy feeling remains that the law does not address the problem
of labor union violence with the vigor that it should. The attitude
seems to be that "boys will be boys;" that a certain amount of
"animal exuberance"' 5 is to be expected in the emotionally super-
charged atmosphere of a labor dispute; and that, while this is to be
regretted, the law should not over-react. 16
This attitude can be seen in all three branches of government.
10. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A)
(1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1444
(1977); Union de Operadores y Conteros de la Industria del Cemento de
Ponce, 231 N.LR.B. 171 (1977); Teamsters Local 695, 204 N.L.RB. 866 (1973).
11. Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 3(e), 3(i), 29 U.S.C. §§ 104(e), (i) (1976).
12. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 41-7-70 (1976).
13. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), which is the subject of this article,
represents the primary attempt of Congress to deal with the specific problem
of labor violence. The Labor Management Relations Act has a broader scope
and direction.
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976), prohibiting conspiracies to injure persons in
the exercise of their federal rights. In United States v. DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d
208 (2d Cir. 1974), the court held, however, that this statute did not apply to
violence by union officials against employees who were attempting to exer-
cise their federal statutory right of refusing to participate in certain union
activities. The court conceded that a violation literally existed, but went on
to ask: "Can Congress have intended the consequences of such improper,
but nevertheless not uncommon acts, to be up to ten years in prison, or a
$10,000 fine, or both? The thought does more than give one pause; it brings
one to a halt, and to a further, more careful look at the Government's posi-
tion." Id. at 211.
15. Under the so-called '"hayer Doctrine," an employee who has been fired for
'engaging in conduct so designated is, despite the otherwise unprotected na-
ture of the conduct, entitled to reinstatement if the employer has engaged in
unfair labor practices which are theoretically assumed to have provoked such
exuberance. The Board only draws the line where "the misconduct is so
flagrant or egregious as to require subordination of the employee's protected
rights [sic] in order to vindicate the broader interests of society as a whole."
W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593, 594 (1975), modified in other respects,
522 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977).
16. See United States v. DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Prosecution under the criminal statutes, especially at the state and
local level, is reportedly lax in certain jurisdictions, perhaps be-
cause of the political sensitivity of the issue. Moreover, where vig-
orous attempts have been made to enforce these statutes against
labor union violence, the administrative agencies and courts have
often either construed the statutes so narrowly as to make them
virtually worthless, or have judicially excluded labor violence from
their coverage altogether. In addition, legislatures, especially Con-
gress, have seemed either unable or unwilling to write statutes
prohibiting labor violence with that degree of specificity that is ap-
parently necessary in order to insure judicial and administrative
enforcement.
In many respects, the federal anti-extortion statutes are an
ideal microcosm of the problems that exist generally with respect
to the law's response to labor violence. In particular, the history of
these statutes and the cases construing them are an excellent ex-
ample of the kind of legislative point and judicial counterpoint that
has left the law in a virtual stalemate. Currently, as a part of the
overall revision of the federal criminal code, the anti-extortion sec-
tions are being revised and their scope and applicability to labor
union violence is again being hotly debated.' 7 One cannot, how-
ever, fully appreciate the probable effect of the proposed changes
except by reference to what has transpired before. The purpose of
this article, thus, is to replow some ground that is concededly old
in the hope that this may shed some useful light on the current
controversy.
II. THE ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT OF 1934
A. The Legislative History
The original federal anti-extortion statute, known as the Anti-
Racketeering Act,18 was one of several bills that came out of the
extensive investigations of "racketeering" conducted in 1933 by the
Copeland Committee, a special subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce.
As introduced in the Senate,' 9 this bill did not specifically in-
clude or exclude the activities of labor unions. However, the Sen-
ate Report stated that "[t] he provisions of the proposed statute are
limited so as not to include the usual activities of capitalistic com-
binations, bona fide labor unions, and ordinary business practices
which are not accompanied by manifestations of racketeering."20
17. See generally § IV of text infra.
18. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)).
19. S. 2248, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 78 CONG. REc. 457 (1934).
20. S. R.P. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
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The report also stated that at that time "the nearest approach to
prosecution of racketeers as such has been under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. '2 1 However, it noted the limitations of that Act, as
construed by the courts, in addressing this particular kind of abu-
sive behavior. It is problematic, of course, whether framers of the
Senate bill had in mind any of the cases in which the Supreme
Court had found the Sherman Act to be inapplicable to various
forms of strike violence.2 2
In any event, it is clear that S. 2248 was intended to go beyond
the limitations of the Sherman Act in dealing with the problems of
"racketeering" and violence in interstate commerce. It did this by
separately prohibiting four things, as they would affect interstate
commerce: (1) acts of violence, intimidation, or injury to person or
property, or threats thereof; (2) extortion of money or other valua-
ble consideration; (3) coercion of persons to join associations or
make payments thereto; and (4) coercion of persons in the exer-
cise of their rights to do or not to do as they choose.
This version of the bill passed the Senate with little or no de-
bate. Moreover, it appears that the bill had been sent to the House
before organized labor awoke to the possible implications insofar
as labor activities were concerned. Senator Robinson, in belatedly
requesting a reconsideration, stated: "Representatives of the
American Federation of Labor informed me this afternoon that
both bills [S. 2248 and a bill dealing with extortion by phone]
might be very discriminatory against labor in this country, and
that they wanted to be heard respecting them."2 3
It is not altogether clear why the AFL thought the bill was "dis-
crimatory" or unfair to them. It seems unlikely that they believed
that labor unions are simply entitled to a blanket exemption from
the normal prohibitions against physical violence and extortion.
In all probability labor feared that the historically elusive term "co-
ercion" might be construed broadly to encompass, in addition to
overt violence, the traditional labor activities of strikes and picket-
ing, especially when such activities were directed at compelling an
employer to recognize the union, to pay union wages, and to stop
hiring non-union labor.24 These objectives would certainly seem to
21. Id. at 1.
22. See, e.g., United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457
(1924); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
23. 78 CONG. REC. 5859 (1934).
24. Under certain forms of the "conspiracy doctrine," labor activities could be
considered actionable or, in legal contemplation, "coercive" if either the ends
or the means were impermissible. Thus, non-violent strikes to obtain a
closed shop could be enjoined in some cases. E.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass.
492 (1900); see T. HAGGARD, COMPuLsORY UNIONIS, THE NLRB, AND THE
CouRTs 21-24 (1977). Organized labor, which had vigorously and more-or-less
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be encompassed by the third and fourth provisions of the bill as
summarized above. Moreover, strikes to obtain these objectives
had been held to be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, and
organized labor knew that the bill was intended to expand that
reach in some unspecified fashion. Thus, the fears of the AFL may
not have been totally unwarranted.
The House was apparently receptive to whatever fears labor
had concerning S. 2248. When the bill was reported out of commit-
tee,25 it had been rewritten so as to prohibit (1) the use of force,
violence, or coercion to obtain or attempt to obtain money or other
valuable consideration, "not including, however, the payment of
wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee";26 (2) the
wrongful use of force to obtain the property of another without his
consent; (3) conduct in furtherance of a plan or purpose to other-
wise violate the Act; and (4) conspiracies to engage in conduct
otherwise prohibited by the Act. A final proviso to the Act also
stated "[t] hat no court of the United States shall construe or apply
any of the provisions of this act in such manner as to impair, di-
minish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona-fide labor organi-
zations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as
such rights are expressed in existing statutes of the United
States."2 7
The House Report, quoting a letter from the Attorney General,
noted that
The original bill was susceptible to the objection that it might include
within its prohibition the legitimate and bona fide activities of employers
and employees. As the purpose of the legislation is not to interfere with
such legitimate activities but rather to set up severe penalties for rack-
eteering by violence, extortion, or coercion, which affects interstate com-
merce, it seems advisable to definitely exclude such legitimate
activities.2 8
Assured that the new bill had the complete approval of orga-
nized labor,2 9 the House and the Senate passed the Act without
further debate.
Despite the effort of Congress to direct the focus of the Act to-
ward organized crime and away from organized labor, some of the
first indictments under the Act were brought against labor union
officials. Thus, it soon became necessary for the courts to clarify
successfully opposed the "conspiracy doctrine" in other contexts, may have
feared its resurrection in the form of this federal criminal law.
25. 78 CONG. REC. 11402-03 (1934).
26. Id. at 11403.
27. Id.
28. M.R. REP. No. 1833, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
29. 78 CONG. REc. 11482 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Copeland).
[Vol. 59:859
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the scope of the labor exemption. One such case ultimately wound
its way to the Supreme Court.
B. The Case Law
In United States v. Local 807, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,3 0 members of the union met trucks as they came into
New York City and used threats and violence to obtain from the
owners of these trucks the equivalent of a day's wage for driving
and unloading the trucks within the city. In some instances the
defendant unionists did in fact perform some work for which they
nevertheless obtained full payment. In others, the owners paid
the money but rejected the offers of the defendants to do the driv-
ing and unloading. There were also instances in which the defend-
ants apparently either failed to offer to do the work or refused to do
any work when asked.
The issue in Local 807 boiled down to whether the unionists
were using force to obtain "wages by a bona-fide employer to a
bona-fide employee,"31 thus bringing the events within the Act's
exception in that regard. Although the Local 807 case involved a
now repealed portion of the Act, what the courts said in this case is
important in evaluating the significance of the congressional repu-
diation of this interpretation, and in determining meaning of the
Act as presently written.32
A number of competing interpretations were proffered in the
opinions of both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
However, the interpretation that was the most obvious and the
most reasonable was dismissed out of hand by the court of ap-
peals. Speaking of the exception, the court noted that
"It] heoretically it might indeed apply only to situations in which
an employee procured by threats the payment of wages due under
a contract which the employer had made without coercion."33 In
other words, a bona fide or uncoerced employment relationship
must exist before the exception is even applicable.
Presumably, the unstated predicate of this interpretation was
that actual physical violence can never really be considered a legit-
imate and bona fide labor union activity, insofar as the final proviso
to the Act is concerned, 34 and that the specific exemption with re-
spect to wages should, therefore, be narrowly construed. Limiting
the exception to violence used by a real employee to obtain the
30. 118 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1941), affd, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
31. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)).
32. For discussion of the Congressional repudiation of Local 807 and the current
version of the Act, see § HI-A of text infra.
33. 118 F.2d at 686.
34. See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
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wages that are legitimately due him recognizes the general prohi-
bition against violence, and at the same time, gives some meaning
to the express words of the statute. Moreover, it makes sense to
read the statute as recognizing a distinction between the use of
force to obtain something that one is not entitled to without the
consent of the other party (a wage contract), and the use of force
to obtain something that one is actually entitled to (wages due
under a previously consented to contract); the former but not the
latter falls within the general meaning of the term "extortion,"35
which was apparently the central concern of Congress in passing
the act.
Nevertheless, the court had two objections to that interpreta-
tion. First, the court felt that there was no real distinction between
using coercion to obtain a contract for wages, and using coercion to
obtain the wages owed under an otherwise noncoerced contract.
The court, however, was simply wrong in that regard; but the
court's willingness to indulge in patently fallacious reasoning to
reach that desired result is probably more important than the logi-
cal fallacy itself.3 6
More importantly, the court of appeals felt that the suggested
interpretation would make the exception too narrow. The court
noted that the exception was clearly intended to cover "labor dis-
putes," that "[p Iractically always the crux of a labor dispute is who
shall get the job and what the terms shall be," and that "[t]o con-
fine the exception to cases where the original contract was volun-
tary would therefore leave out the great mass of instances in which
the issue would ever arise. ' 37 This, however, simply begs the ques-
tion of whether, with respect to the use of actual physical violence
in contrast to the use of economic power, Congress intended the
exemption to be narrow or broad.
In any event, the court of appeals obviously had to give the term
"bona fide" some other meaning to avoid this particular interpreta-
35. The common definition of criminal extortion is as follows: "Extortion is a
crime when... any person extorts that which is not due, or more than is due,
or before the time when it is due." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 525 (5th ed.
1979).
36. In order to demonstrate that there was no distinction between the two, the
court noted that "if any employer is coerced into making a contract, the coer-
cion ordinarily persists until the wages fall due, so that it is proper to speak of
them as being 'obtained' by the original threats, or violence. . . ." 118 F.2d at
686. While that assertion may well be true, the converse cannot be inferred,
namely that if the wages due are obtained through coercion, this necessarily
means that the original contract was obtained in like fashion. Nevertheless,
this is what would have to be inferred in order to be consistent with the
court's notion that the statute recognized no distinction between these two
uses of force.
37. 118 F.2d at 686.
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tion. Accordingly, the majority held that the requirement of "bona
fides" was not met and thus, the exception did not apply where the
money was paid on a "pretext of service never in fact rendered."38
Conversely, the exception was said to apply whenever the "em-
ployee really did the work for which he was paid."39 However, the
majority immediately expanded the exception to include pay-
ments made to a person who offered to do the work but whose offer
was refused by the person being coerced to make the payments. It
was on this specific point that the dissent parted company with
remainder of the court.4 0 The court noted that while it might be
difficult to call such payments "wages," it would nevertheless be
nonsensical to assume that Congress wanted to grant immunity to
one who used coercion to the point of actually getting the job, but,
at the same time, penalize another who did not persist "in pressing
his unwelcome services upon the employer."4 ' The court noted
that this would "excuse the more heinous offense, and penalize the
more venial."42
The majority also felt that interpreting "bona fides," to include
any coercively obtained payments as long as work was performed
or tendered was justified by reference to the evil that Congress in-
tended to suppress by this Act. The court noted that what Con-
gress had in mind was the "blackmail" that "organized gangs of
bandits" had levied upon many small businessmen, especially in
New York City.43 Labor violence, aimed at the legitimate objectives
of obtaining jobs and higher wages, was said to be an altogether
different matter. The court noted:
Congress might indeed have gone further than it did; it might have in-
cluded payments extorted by threats for services rendered or offered; that
too is a grave evil. But, grave as it is, it is of a different kind from that at
which this act was aimed. The history of labor disputes is studded with
violence which unhappily is not yet obsolete; but, although the means em-
ployed may be the same as those here condemned, the end is always dif-
ferent, for it is to secure work on better terms.4 4
This notion that the "legitimacy" of the ends somehow takes
otherwise violent means outside the prohibitions of the statute has
proved to be persistently appealing insofar as the courts are con-
cerned. Although Congress expressly repudiated the Supreme
Court decision which affirmed and restated this idea,45 the theory
was subsequently to reappear. Remarkably, it today represents
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 690 (Hand, J., dissenting).
41. 118 F.2d at 687.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 688.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. See § III-A of text infra.
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the prevailing interpretation of the amended statute.46
On appeal the Supreme Court again couched the issue in Local
807 in terms of finding a correct construction of the wage proviso,
and suggested three alternative interpretations. The Court first
considered the possibility that "[t]he exception applies only to a
defendant who has enjoyed the status of a bona fide employee
prior to the time at which he obtains or attempts to obtain the pay-
ment of money by the owner."47 Presumably, this interpretation
had been considered and rejected by the court below. The
Supreme Court rejected it, in part for the same reason-such a
reading would allegedly exclude practically all labor disputes from
the exemption, a result which the Court found incompatible with
the probable intent of Congress. In addition, the Court found this
interpretation inconsistent with the literal wording of the statute.
The statute "does not except 'a bona-fide employee who obtains
... wages from a bona-fide employer.' Rather, it excepts 'any per-
son who... obtains... the payment of wages from a bona-fide
employer to a bona fide employee.' 48 This is simply a disingenu-
ous distortion of the suggested interpretation. The distinction un-
derlying the interpretation focuses not on who uses coercion but
for whom it is used. Coercion would be within the exception only
when the person for whom it is used has an otherwise uncoerced
employment relationship under which wages are owed.
The second possible interpretation considered by the Court
was that the exception "does not apply if the owner's intention in
making the payment is to buy 'protection' and not to buy service,
even though the defendant may intend to perform the service or
may actually perform it.''49 This was apparently the interpretation
argued for by the government. However, the Supreme Court re-
jected it on the ground that the state of mind of the victim could
not properly be decisive of the guilt of the defendant. The Court
made it quite obvious that it viewed the exception as clearly con-
templating the use of violence in labor disputes, as long as it was
for a "legitimate" end.
For example, the members of a labor union may decide that they are enti-
tled to the jobs in their trade in a particular area. They may agree to at-
tempt to obtain contracts to do the work at the union wage scale. They
may obtain the contracts, do the work, and receive the money. Certainly
Congress intended that these activities should be excepted from the
prohibitions of this particular Act, even though the agreement may have
contemplated the use of violence. But it is always an open question
whether the employers' capitulation to the demands of the union is
46. See notes 152-53 & accompanying text infra.
47. 315 U.S. at 527-28.
48. Id. at 531.
49. Id. at 528.
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prompted by a desire to obtain services or to avoid further injury or both.
To make a fine or prison sentence for the union and its members contin-
gent upon a finding by the jury that one motive or the other dominated the
employers' decision would be a distortion of the legislative purpose.50
Given later developments in Congress and before the courts,
one cannot overemphasize the critical importance of this language.
It clearly suggests that, in the Supreme Court's view, the first prin-
ciple of the statute was that it was not intended to apply to vio-
lence aimed at attaining traditional labor goals. The victim's state
of mind was rejected by the Court as a relevant consideration only
because its use might operate in derogation of that principle.
Since the instructions of the trial judge to the jury had suggested
the controlling importance of the victim's intentions in paying the
money, the Supreme Court necessarily found that the conviction
had to be set aside, and it, therefore, affirmed the court of appeals.
Finally, the Court discussed a third possible interpretation over
which the court of appeals was divided-namely, whether the trial
judge erred in suggesting that payments for work not actually done
could never be considered "wages," notwithstanding the defend-
ants' willingness to do the work. In this regard, the Court noted
that both the majority and the dissent below had agreed that the
payment of money to one who refuses to do any work is clearly not
within the exception, but that payments to one who actually does
the work clearly is within the exception. The Court apparently
concurred with that view and stated that "[t]he doubtful case
arises where the defendants agree to tender their services in good
faith to an employer and to work if he accepts their offer, but agree
further... that he should pay an amount equivalent to the pre-
vailing union wage even if he rejects their proffered services."'51
The Court resolved the doubt in favor of finding such payments to
be "wages" for the purposes of the statute.
The Court said that in determining whether the exemption ap-
plied or not, "[t] he test must ... be whether the particular activity
was among or is akin to labor union activities with which Congress
must be taken to have been familiar when this measure was en-
acted."52 Referring to the so-called "'stand-by' orchestra device,
by which a union local requires that its members be substituted
for visiting musicians, or, if the producer or conductor insists upon
using his own musicians, that the members of the local be paid the
sums which they would have earned had they performed," 53 the
Court concluded that the practice of accepting payments even
50. Id. at 532-33.
51. Id. at 534.




when the services are refused was within the contemplation of
Congress and, therefore, within the exemption.
The Court's holding on this point provides even further evi-
dence of its preoccupation with the notion that if the objective is a
traditionally legitimate one from labor's perspective, then conduct
aimed at obtaining it does not constitute "extortion," no matter
how violent it is. This, in sum, seems to be the recurring theme of
the Local 807 decision.
Chief Justice Stone registered a strong dissent in the case. His
dissent is important because many in Congress later referred to it
expressly as evidencing the proper approach to the problem of la-
bor extortion. Unfortunately, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly
where in the analysis the Chief Justice parted company with his
brethren. In his view the elements of an offense under the Act
were: The defendants used force to compel the payment of money;
these payments were made to purchase immunity from violence
and for no other reason; and this end was knowingly sought by the
defendants. With respect to the specific facts of the Local 807 case,
Chief Justice Stone clearly believed that illegal extortion occurs
when an employer is forced to make payments for work not done,
even when it is the employer himself who has elected not to use
the services of an otherwise willing worker. He noted that
"[u] nless the language of the statute is to be disregarded, one who
has rejected the proffered service and pays money only in order to
purchase immunity from violence is not a bona fide employer and
is not paying the extorted money as wages."54
Moreover, the Chief Justice believed that the performance of
some work did not necessarily bring forced payments within the
exception. He cited with approval an instruction by the trial judge
which stated that "[ilf... what the operator was paying for was
not labor performed but merely for protection from interference by
the defendants with the operation of the operator's trucks, the fact
that a defendant may have done some work on an operator's truck
is not conclusive. '55 Furthermore, he noted that "[t]he character
of what the drivers or owners did and intended to do-pay money
to avoid a beating-was not altered by the willingness of the payee
to accept as wages for services rendered what he in fact intention-
ally exacted from the driver or owner as the purchase price of im-
munity from assault, and what he intended so to exact whether the
proffered services were accepted or not. '56
On the other hand, the Chief Justice did concede that "the pro-
curing of jobs by violence is not within the Act... "and that this
54. Id. at 540 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 542.
56. Id. at 540.
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may include "the 'stand-by' job where no actual service is ren-
dered .... -57
What one may synthesize from these various assertions is that,
from Chief Justice Stone's perspective, the critical issue was what
constituted the "essential purpose" of the transaction. If the "es-
sential purpose" of the transaction is to exchange money in return
for work done (or for someone being available to work, as in a
"stand-by" situation), there is no violation of the statute even if
violence is used to accomplish the transaction. On the other hand,
if the "essential purpose" of the transaction is to exchange money
in return for freedom from violence, a violation does exist even if
work is done or offered to be performed. However, the Chief Jus-
tice did not suggest specific, objective indicia that can be used in
identifying such purposes. He conceded, rather, that this is ulti-
mately to be determined by a jury by reference to the perceived
intent of the two parties. Since the instructions of the trial judge
were consistent with Justice Stone's interpretation of the law, he
believed that the convictions should stand.
The Local 807 case virtually emasculated the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934 insofar as its effectiveness as a tool against labor vio-
lence was concerned. Whether the case was consistent with the
original legislative intent is hard to tell, given the obscurity and
brevity of the legislative history on the issue. The intent of Con-
gress sitting at the time the case was decided is, however, a differ-
ent matter.
Ill. THE HOBBS ACT AMENDMENTS
A. Legislative History
Congressional reaction to the Local 807 case was as swift as it
was negative. Bills were introduced in the 77th,58 78th,59 and ulti-
mately the 79th Congress 60 to correct what Congress considered to
be an outrageous decision. The legislative solution that ultimately
prevailed, the so-called Hobbs Act,61 was originally introduced in
the 1943 session.6 2 It passed the House that year,63 but died in the
Senate. It was reintroduced the following year and finally enacted
57. Id. at 541.
58. S. 2347, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 6872, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); HR.
7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
59. H.R. 653, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 3218 (1943).
60. H.R. 32, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), becoming Hobbs Act §§ 1-6, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1976).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
62. See note 59 supra.
63. The debates in the House on HI. 653 were fairly extensive and are as much a




Fearful that any repetition of the exact language of the 1934
Anti-Racketeering Act would give the Supreme Court an excuse
for adhering to the Local 807 approach, Congress completely re-
wrote the law and took special pains to eliminate the specific lan-
guage on which the decision was based. The new Act provided
that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physi-
cal violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.65
The terms "robbery," "extortion," and "commerce" were de-
fined, and the final paragraph of the Act, the exact wording of
which produced much debate, provided that "[tihis section shall
not be construed to repeal, modify or affect" the Clayton Act, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Railway Labor Act, or the National La-
bor Relations Act.66 Notably absent was anything akin to the wage
exception of the 1934 Act. Indeed, an amendment again exempting
"wages" from the coverage of the Hobbs Act was rejected on the
specific grounds that this would simply open the door to another
Local 807 decision. 67
The legislative history makes absolutely clear that Congress
viewed the Local 807 case as wrongly decided.68 Thus, the Hobbs
Act was at least written to require a contrary result on those iden-
tical facts, but how much beyond that Congress intended to go is a
matter of speculation.
may be deduced as are the debates on the identical bill in the following ses-
sion. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404 n.14 (1973).
64. After passing the House in independent form, 91 CONG. REC. 11922 (1945), the
substance of the Hobbs Act was also incorporated into the Case Bill, HR.
4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), which passed Congress but which was ve-
toed by President Truman, 92 CONG. REC. 674 (1946). Immediately after the
veto, the Senate took up and passed the Hobbs Act as previously approved in
independent form by the House, 92 CONG. REC. 7308 (1946), thus making it law
in spite of the veto. See generally Comment, Labor Law--A New Federal An-
tiracketeering Law, 35 GEO. L.J. 362 (1947); Comment, The Hobbs Act-An
Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Ac4 25 N.C. L REV. 58 (1946).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
66. Id.
67. 91 CONG. REc. 11913-19 (1945). Speaking of the Local 807 case, Congressman
Sumners also said: "It was the purpose of the Judiciary Committee to pre-
vent the rendition of that sort of decision by any court in the future, so the
language upon which that holding was based was eliminated." Id. at 11909.
68. Congressman Hancock called the Local 807case "a gross misinterpretation of
the law and a distortion of the intent of Congress." 91 CONG. REC. 11900
(1945). See also 88 CONG. REC. 2071, 5334-35 (1942); 89 CONG. REc. 3193, 3201,
3202, 3206-07, 3220 (1943).
[Vol. 59:859
LABOR VIOLENCE
To determine what impact the Hobbs Act was intended to have
upon various kinds of violent labor union activity, one can conve-
niently break the legislative history down into five categories: (1)
Congressional interpretations of the holding and the dissent in the
Local 807 case; (2) specific examples of the kinds of conduct the
new Act was intended to reach; (3) interpretations of the "no re-
peal" proviso and the suggested alternative; (4) the basis of labor's
opposition and the congressional responses thereto; and (5) the as-
sertions of no intended "discrimination" for or against labor.
1. Interpretations of the Local 807 Case
Generally speaking, Congress read the Local 807 case very
broadly. The sponsor of one of the first bills introduced on the
matter said the case "in effect, placed the Congress in the position
of condoning and authorizing the use of force and violence in en-
forcing demands so long as such force and violence are practiced
by members of labor organizations and unions."69 Similarly, it was
said that the case holds "in effect that the use of force and violence
was not incompatible to the lawful settlement of disputes between
employers and employees. ' 70 In the debates on the Hobbs Act as
introduced the first time, one congressman said: "I think the in-
tent of the Congress in the 1934 statute was to protect the lawful
activities of organized labor. The construction put on it by the
Supreme Court would authorize unlawful acts-certainly never in-
tended by this Congress."'71
In these and other instances the concern of Congress seemed to
focus on the fact that the Local 807 case allowed labor unions to
use physical violence to enforce their demands against employers.
It was, apparently, of no particular moment that in the Local 807
case the demands specifically involved payments for unwanted, if
not unused, labor. Assuming that the Hobbs Act was intended as a
negation of a broad reading of the Local 807 case, it follows that
Congress intended to prohibit the use of all violence in the en-
forcement of labor union demands regardless of the particular na-
ture of the demands.
On the other hand, a somewhat narrower interpretation of the
Local 807 case is reflected in the comments of Congressman Han-
cock, a proponent of the Hobbs Act. "[T]he Supreme Court," he
said, "held that.., members of Teamsters Union 807 in New York
City were exempt from the provisions of that law when attempting
by the use of force or the threat of violence to obtain wages for a
69. 88 CONG. REc. 2071 (1942) (remarks of Sen. Holman).
70. Id. at 5334-35.
71. 89 CONG. REc. 3202 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Gwynne).
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job whether they rendered any services or not."72 This suggests
that the objectionable aspect of the Local 807 case that was being
legislatively overruled pertained not to the permitted use of vio-
lence alone, but to its use to achieve that particular result. Conse-
quently, an intent to negate that aspect of Local 807 would not
support an inference that Congress intended to prohibit all forci-
bly backed union demands.
Perhaps the clearest indication of what Congress intended by
its repudiation of Local 807 can be found in the fact that the dis-
senting opinion of Chief Justice Stone was repeatedly referred to
in approving terms.7 3 Indeed, at one point Congressman Whitting-
ton expressly stated that "[tjhe real purpose of the bill is to re-
move any doubt about the interpretation of the act by the Chief
Justice being correct."7 4 Unfortunately, as has been seen, Mr. Jus-
tice Stone's opinion is somewhat obscure as to the Act's prohibi-
tion against violence in the labor context.7 5
2. Specific Examples of Prohibited Conduct
The examples given of the kind of union conduct the new Act
was designed to reach are much more helpful than are interpreta-
tions of Local 807 in assessing the legislative intent. The facts of
the Local 807 case were, of course, cited time and time again as
being prototypical of the kind of abusive labor conduct Congress
wanted to reach through the Hobbs Act,7 6 but other examples were
also given. Congressman Anderson spoke of where the Teamsters
used force in connection with a demand that drivers entering San
Francisco either become members of the union or use Teamster
drivers while within the city.77 He also spoke of the situation
where, in support of an organizational drive among dairy employ-
ees, a Teamsters Union refused to haul the dairy farmers' milk into
the city, resulting in considerable spoilage.7 8 This was considered
an act of "coercion" in the colloquial sense, and one which the pro-
posed Act was intended to reach.79
Congressman Baldwin of Maryland cited the example of a
strike in Baltimore where sabotage and other acts of violence had
been directed against the employer and his property:
72. 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945) (emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., 88 CONG. REC. 2071 (1942); 89 CONG. REC. 3206, 3210, 3217 (1943).
74. 89 CONG. REC. 3221 (1943).
75. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
76. See note 68 supra.





This bill would not have been presented to the House if organized labor
had recognized law and order in striking and in establishing their rights,
as they have a right to do. Everyone can remember the taxicab strike in
the city of Baltimore, . . . where cabs were overthrown, bricks thrown
through the windows endangering the lives of people, innocent victims.
Mr. Chairman, labor has a right to strike, but when labor perpetrates
that sort of thing, they are going far beyond the bounds of reason. Cer-
tainly, I do not take the position that labor has not the right to organize or
to strike, but when they do so they should abide by the ... laws of de-
cency. If they had done that, we would not have this legislation before the
House today.
8 0
Thus, it is relatively clear that these members of Congress in-
tended the Hobbs Act to prohibit forms of labor violence other
than the kind of "featherbedding" practices that were at issue in
Local 807. It appears that the proposed Act was also intended to
prohibit the use of violence and coercion to obtain otherwise legiti-
mate objectives such as the organization of employees, member-
ship in the union, the acquisition of work for union members, or a
favorable collective bargaining agreement.
3. Debate Over the "No Repeal" Proviso
As drafted by Congressman Hobbs, the bill simply said that the
four leading labor laws then in existence were not to be considered
repealed, modified, or affected by the new legislation. Congress-
man Celler, however, proposed and strenously argued for an
amendment which would have provided that "no acts, conduct, or
activities which are lawful under [the four acts in question] ...
shall constitute a violation of this act."81 Congressman Celler felt
that as drafted the exception to the bill would not protect labor in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the other statutes; the "no re-
peal" language, he conceded, would continue to protect the exer-
cise of those rights from prosecution under the former statutes, but
not necessarily from prosecution under the proposed Hobbs Act. 82
Congressman Celler's interpretation of the language was not a
reasonable one. Language of this kind would normally be con-
strued to mean that if any of the four labor statutes grant labor
unions an affirmative right to engage in a particular kind of con-
duct, the Hobbs Act should not be construed as taking that right
away. However, it was repeatedly pointed out that none of the
four acts gave unions the affirmative right to engage in any acts of
force and violence prohibited by the Hobbs Act.83
On the other hand, Congressman Celler's version of the excep-
80. Id. at 11918 (1945) (emphasis added).
81. 89 CONG. REC. 3220 (1943).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3193, 3202.
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tion would have seriously limited the scope of the Act insofar as
labor union activities were concerned. It is reasonably apparent
from his explanations of the proposed amendment that he con-
strued the term "lawful" to mean "not illegal."84 Saying that cer-
tain conduct is "not illegal" under a specific statute, as per Celler's
version, is vastly different from saying that the statute makes such
conduct a matter of "right." The Clayton Act,85 for example, did
not give labor unions an affirmative "right" to use force in the set-
tlement of strikes; but the use of such force had also been held to
be "not illegal" under that statute.86 Arguably, under the Celler
amendment it would not be subject to prosecution under the
Hobbs Act either.87 Thus, some labor leaders privately conceded
that the Celler amendment would have nullified the Hobbs Act al-
together, at least insofar as labor activities were concerned. 88 If an
act was not already illegal under one of the four statutes, the
Hobbs Act simply would not cover it.
Congressman Hobbs opposed the Celler amendment on slightly
different grounds. He feared that if certain things which are gener-
ally "lawful" under the labor statutes were declared to be beyond
the purview of the Hobbs Act, it would be construed as also ex-
cluding the pursuit of these "lawful" ends by "unlawful" means.8 9
He said,
Mr. Chairman, almost any crime may be committed while the perpetra-
tor is engaged in otherwise lawful acts, conduct or activities.
... Because a man is engaged in the perfectly lawful conduct of strik-
ing, is he guiltless if he commits rape?
Picketing is lawful. But does that mean that a picket cannot be pun-
ished for stealing?
The right of collective bargaining is guaranteed by law. Does that give
collective bargainers the right to murder?
Honestly and peaceably seeking employment is not only lawful, but
commendable. However, it is equally lawful for one from whom employ-
ment is sought to refuse it. Does any sane and reasonable man contend
that the right honestly and peacefully to seek employment gives the
seeker the right to force employment or to beat the refuser?
I submit that for these reasons the Celler amendment is dangerous,
especially in view of the decision in the Local 807 case, which held that no
matter how much violence might accompany a request for employment it
84. See id. at 3220.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1974).
86. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (Court held that
labor union activity that was illegal under local law could be legal under the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
87. See 89 CONG. REC. 3202 (1943) (remarks of Congressman Gwynne).
88. Id. at 3203, 3224 (remarks of Rep. Baldwin).
89. Id. at 3194-95, 3220-21 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs).
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was all right and you are perfectly innocent under the antiracketeering
law. The same thing is true here. No matter what may be said about the
Celler amendment, it still does not require, as do the acts to which it
points, that lawful acts, conduct or activities must be done in a lawful and
peaceful way. Without that or something like that the amendment should
be defeated.90
The relevance and importance of this language used by the au-
thor of the Hobbs Act cannot be emphasized too strongly. In
slightly different terms, what Congressman Hobbs was saying was
that the fact that the objective or end is legitimate under one of the
general labor statutes does not mean that such objective can be
pursued by violent means. Rightly or wrongly, Congressman
Hobbs feared that the Celler amendment would have that effect
insofar as prosecutions under the proposed anti-extortion statute
were concerned. Necessarily, Congressman Hobbs also believed
that the statute as he drafted it did not have that effect. The Celler
amendment was defeated.91
4. Objections to the Hobbs Act and the Responses
It is significant to note that, on a substantive level, the opposi-
tion to the Act was not grounded on the fact that it was to be a
violation of federal criminal law for labor unions to use actual
physical violence in furtherance of their organizational or collec-
tive bargaining objectives. The substantive objection, rather, was
that the Act might be construed in such a way as to also preclude
unions from pursuing these legitimate goals by the traditional
methods of peaceful strikes and picketing. Congressman Celler,
for example, noted:
There are courts which have held that whenever workers seek to bring
about a wage increase or other adjustment of their working conditions by
a strike, however peacefully conducted, they are attempting to "force"
their employer to grant the wage increase or grant the requested adjust-
ment of their working conditions. 92
He also feared that even a mere demand for a wage increase might
be construed as an implied promise to strike if it were not granted,
thus making it an illegal 'Threat." 93 Congressman Celler, con-
cerned that the Hobbs Act might be similarly construed, also noted
that "there are courts which have held that picketing, however
peacefully conducted, is by its very nature an attempt to force the
employer into action which he is not willing to take."9'
Similarly, Congressman LaFollette said of the terms of the Act
90. Id. at 3220-21.
91. Id. at 3225.
92. 91 CONG. REC. 11901 (1945).
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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that: "I think they are broad enough to cover a discussion between
employees as to whether or not they shall join a union. Those
things are often accompanied by heated discussions which might
be called coercion and they would affect the right of labor to or-
ganize."9 5
The proponents of the bill, however, consistently denied these
charges. It is important to note that the basis of their denial was
not that the ends being sought in these examples were legitimate
ones, thus putting the means being used to achieve them beyond
the purview of the Act. Instead, they answered that otherwise
peaceful strikes and picketing are not acts of force or violence;
such acts are specifically protected by federal statute and could
not, thus, be considered a violation of the Hobbs Act. This point
was made repeatedly. Congressman Hancock, in responding spe-
cifically to the claims of Congressman Celler, said: "A moment ago
the gentleman said the threat of a strike came within the definition
of extortion. This bill merely prohibits the wrongful use of force or
threats. That cannot apply to a threatened strike because strikes
are lawful, they are not wrongful. ' 96 Similarly, in giving a negative
response to the question of whether a threat to go on strike would
constitute a violation under the proposed bill, Congressman Sum-
ners said, "as I... understand this bill, there is not a thing in it to
interfere in the slightest degree with any legitimate activity on the
part of labor people or labor unions, unless somebody thinks it is
legitimate for them to rob and extort."97
That robbery and extortion were intended to connote acts of
physical violence is also evident in Congressman Gwynne's listing
of what the government would have to prove in order to obtain a
conviction under the statute-namely, that the conduct affects in-
terstate commerce, that there be an actual taking of property, and
that this be done "by violence, by personal violence, or by actual
threats of personal violence."98 Likewise, Congressman Fellows
noted that "the so-called Hobbs bill is designed to make assault
and battery and highway robbery unpopular. Its purpose is to pro-
tect trade and commerce [which would certainly include the nego-
tiation of collective labor agreements and most other labor-related
activities] against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or in-
timidation."99
Congressman Savage was concerned about the Act's effect on a
95. Id. at 11920.
96. Id. at 11902.
97. Id. at 11908.
98. Id. at 11903.
99. Id. at 11907.
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"strike for better working conditions. u 0 0 A response by Congress-
man Barden distinguished a peaceful strike from the type of activ-
ity the Act was designed to prohibit. Focusing on the means used
to accomplish the ends sought, he said:
Do not talk to me about the man on strike. If he were an honest gen-
tleman, he would not commit such offenses as robbery or extortion while
on strike or off strike.
... The fact that a man is on strike certainly does not license him to be
an outlaw...
Good honest men do not commit robbery. They do not commit bur-
glary. They do not beat up innocent people. They do not extort money.
Good honest men do not do those things. exy
A few moments later Congressman Michener said that "this bill
will not interfere with legitimate strikes" 10 -- presumably referring
to strikes which are both peaceful and directed toward an other-
wise legal end.
Congressman LaFollette also shared the fears of labor that the
proposed Hobbs Act might be construed too broadly. Neverthe-
less, he did agree that the use of force or violence, even if it was to
obtain wages, should be clearly prohibited. Thus, he proposed an
amendment to that effect and said:
If we put a construction into this statute which states that a bona fide
payment of wages from an employer to an employee shall not include
wages or the transfer of a thing of value which is obtained by violence or
the threat of use of violence, then we reach the situation we are attempt-
ing to reach .... 103
The amendment was rejected presumably because the Local
807 case caused the majority to avoid the "bona fide wages" lan-
guage altogether and, instead, couch the prohibitions of the statute
in even broader language. It would, however, be incongruous in-
deed to now construe the Act as not reaching as far as even its
opponents were willing to go. 104
On the other hand, the most commonly cited indication that the
Act was not designed to reach mere strike violence is contained in
the following exchange:
Mr. MTARCANTONIO. All right. In connection with a strike, if an inci-
dent occurs which involves-
Mr. HOBBS. The gentleman needs go no further. This bill does not
cover strikes or any question relating to strikes.
100. Id. at 11841 (remarks of Rep. Savage).
101. Id. (remarks of Rep. Barden).
102. Id. at 11843 (remarks of Rep. Michener).
103. Id. at 11846 (remarks of Rep. LaFollette) (emphasis added).
104. Nevertheless, such a result was, in effect, reached by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Emnons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), where the Court held that the
use of violence to obtain a more favorable collective bargaining agreement
(covering, among other things, the payment of wages) was not within the
prohibitions of the Hobbs Act. See text accompanying notes 166-200 infra.
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Mr. MARCANTONIO. Will the gentleman put a provision in the bill
stating so?
Mr. HOBBS. We do not have to, because a strike is perfectly lawful
and has been so described by the Supreme Court and by the statutes we
have passed. This bill takes off from the springboard that the act must be
unlawful to come within the purview of this bill.
Mr. MARCANTONIO. That does not answer my point. My point is that
an incident such as a simple assault which takes place in a strike could
happen. Am I correct?
Mr. HOBBS. Certainly.
Mr. MARCANTONIO. That then could become an extortion under the
gentleman's bill, and that striker as well as his union officials could be
charged with violation of sections in this bill.
Mr. HOBBS. I disagree with that and deny it in toto.
10 5
Congressman Gwynne also indicated that the Act was not in-
tended to cover "a clash between strikers and scabs during a
strike."'1 06 Presumably, Congressman Hobbs also had this kind of
picket line violence in mind. If so, the import of what Congress-
man Hobbs was saying becomes clear. Based on what he said else-
where in the record,107 it is inconceivable that he intended to
exempt violence simply because it occurred in conjunction with an
otherwise legal strike. Although some of the opponents of the bill
felt that "minor altercations on the picket line"'108 should not be
treated as felonies, there is no basis for assuming that Congress-
man Hobbs or any other supporter of the bill intended any distinc-
tion between "major" and 'inor" acts of violence.109 Rather,
Congressman Hobbs's statement must be viewed in the context of
the specific crimes the bill purported to prohibit--extortion and
robbery. The purpose of most picket line violence is to prevent
persons against whom it is directed from entering the employer's
premises, not to obtain money from them. It is difficult to see how
such violence could be conceptualized as either extortion or rob-
bery. In short, Congressman Hobbs was simply recognizing that
the Act did not reach all violence, but only that which would fit
within the legal definition of extortion or robbery.
5. The Intent Not to Discriminate For or Against Labor
The fifth category of legislative remarks shedding light on the
intended scope of the Hobbs Act are those which indicated that
the Act should not discriminate on the basis of whether the violent
actor was or was not associated with a labor union. Many con-
gressmen objected to the Local 807 case because it seemed to
105. 89 CONG. REc. 3213 (1943).
106. Id. at 3202 (remarks of Rep. Gwynne).
107. See notes 89-90 & accompanying text supra.
108. 91 CONG. REC. 11901 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
109. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 410 n.20 (1973).
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grant a special license to labor unions alone to use violence in the
pursuit of their goals. For example, Congressman Hobbs said that
the case "decided that no matter how much violence a union man
might use in seeking employment, he could not be punished under
the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act."" 0 He added,
I am saying that is the effect of the construction put upon robbery commit-
ted while engaged in otherwise lawful conduct by the Supreme Court de-
cision. No matter how much force is used, robbery is a perfectly innocent
pastime, as Chief Justice Stone said, if the perpetrator be a labor-union
member seeking employment.1 11
Similarly, it was also said that the Local 807 case "in effect,
placed the Congress in the position of condoning and authorizing
the use of force and violence in enforcing demands so long as such
force and violence are practiced by members of labor organizations
and unions.""2 Such favored treatment was clearly not accepta-
ble to Congress; it was the nature of the act and not the status of
the actor that Congress thought was of controlling importance, and
the Hobbs Act was designed to implement that policy. On this
point, the following exchange is revealing:
Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. There is nothing in this bill dealing with per-
sons connected with organized labor as such. It is just an attempt on the
part of the Committee on the Judiciary to bring in a bill that will prevent
this type of robbery in interstate commerce.
Mr. MICHENER. That is all there is to it. The only way labor is in-
volved is that if these offenders belong to the union, and by robbery or
exploitation collect a day's wage-a union wage-they are not exempted
from the law solely because they are engaging in a legitimate union activ-
ity.1 1 3
In other words, "[a]ll are treated alike and no group is given spe-
cial permission to violate the law."" 4 Moreover, as these remarks
demonstrate, the legitimacy of a group's goal or objective is irrele-
vant.
A fairly clear pattern emerges from this legislative history.
Congress did not intend to interfere with otherwise peaceful
strikes and picketing. Yet, Congress did intend to prohibit the use
of force, violence, and threats as a means of obtaining wages or
other things of value from an employer despite the fact that ob-
taining such benefits might be otherwise completely legitimate. In
other words, as brokers of employee services, labor unions were to
be limited in the use of force to the same extent as were other bro-
kers or sellers of commodities; in either instance, the effectuation
110. 89 CONG. REC. 3195 (1943) (emphasis added).
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. 88 CONG. REC. 2071 (1942) (remarks of Sen. Holman) (emphasis added).
113. 91 CONG. REC. 11843-44 (1945) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 11844 (remarks of Rep. Michener).
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of the exchange through the use of force was to be prohibited as
extortion.
B. The Case Law
Although even a cursory review of the legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to prohibit labor
from using force or violence as a means of obtaining concessions
from employers, the initial judicial reaction was still somewhat
hesitant. For example, in United States v. Kemble' 15 the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was faced with facts not unlike those in Lo-
cal 807. A union official had used actual and threatened violence
to cause an employer to hire a union member to unload a truck
whenever it made deliveries to an RCA plant. These services were
not otherwise desired by this employer. The court had little diffi-
culty in finding that, on these particular facts, a violation existed.
The court, however, did hedge somewhat when it stated that:
The conclusion seems inescapable that Congress intended that the lan-
guage used in the 1946 statute be broad enough to include, in proper cases,
the forced payment of wages. We say "in proper cases" advisedly. For it
is not necessary that we here consider the great variety of circumstances
in which coercion may be involved in the payment of wages. We need not
consider the normal demand for wages as compensation for services de-
sired by or valuable to the employer. It is enough for this case, and all we
decide, that payment of money for imposed, unwanted and superfluous
services such as the evidence shows Kemble attempted to enforce here by
violent obstruction of commerce is within the language and intendment of
the statute.116
Although the majority decision was cautious in construing the
scope of the new Act, it still went too far in the opinion of dissent-
ing Judge McLaughlin. Notwithstanding the legislative history, he
felt that the disagreement Congress had with the Local 807 deci-
sion was a relatively narrow one. He maintained that the Supreme
Court there had held that: (1) the use of force to become a genuine
employee (one who actually works and is paid for it) was within
the "wage" exception, and (2) the use of force to compel the pay-
ment of wages when the services of the would-be employee are re-
fused was also within this exception. According to Judge
McLaughlin, Congress' quarrel with the decision and its repudia-
tion thereof pertained only to the second point, and that the de-
fendant's conduct in this case fell within the still exempt first
point. As such, it merely represented "a reputable union's genuine
attempt to organize a trucking corporation,"' 1 7 which was not the
kind of conduct that the Hobbs Act was intended to prohibit. Gen-
115. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
116. 198 F.2d at 891-92 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 895 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
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erally, he felt that the use of violence by a labor union in pursuit of
a legitimate goal, such as obtaining work for its members, is not a
violation of the Hobbs Act; instead, it is a matter for state and local
prohibition.
Judge McLaughlin's theory was rejected not only by the Third
Circuit in Kemble but also, later, by the Supreme Court;118 but not
without first picking up some support elsewhere. In United States
v. Green,119 Federal District Judge Adair reversed a conviction on
the grounds that the facts as alleged in the indictment did not state
an offense under the Hobbs Act. The indictment, tracking fairly
closely the language used in the Kemble case, charged that the de-
fendant had used "actual and threatened force, violence and fear"
to cause "wages to be paid for imposed, unwanted, superfluous,
and fictitious services of laborers.' 1 20 In concluding that this did
not state an offense under the Act, Judge Adair relied on the pro-
viso to the Hobbs Act which states that it was not designed to "re-
peal, modify or affect the provisions of... the Wagner Act."' 2 1
Given the legislative history of this section,'2 of which Judge
Adair purported to have made "a personal investigation as to the
intent of Congress,' 23 it is startling indeed to see how the section
was used to support the result he reached. Noting that in several
cases the Supreme Court had held that "a demand by a Union rep-
resentative for 'feather-bedding' is not an unfair labor practice"1 24
under the Wagner Act, Judge Adair stated, "[ilt seems incongru-
ous that Congress intended that a lawful act"l2 under one statute
would be punishable as a felony under another.
This reasoning is remarkable in two respects. First, it proceeds
as if the Cellar version of the proviso had been adopted rather than
the committee or Hobbs version. As previously discussed, Con-
gressman Celler wanted the language to read, "no acts ... which
are lawful" under the labor statutes shall be considered unlawful
under the Hobbs Act, with "lawful" apparently being equivalent to
"not illegal."'126 Although Congress expressly rejected that ap-
118. See notes 130-38 & accompanying text infra.
119. 135 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. 1ll. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
120. 135 F. Supp. at 162.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
122. See § ]I1-A-3 of text supra.
123. 135 F. Stipp. at 162-63.
124. Id. at 163. Judge Adair was undoubtedly correct in concluding that the
union's objective in this case was "not illegitimate." This conclusion, as well
as its significance insofar as the current law is concerned, will be discussed
subsequently. See note 151 & accompanying text infra.
125. 135 F. Supp. at 163.
126. See note 84 & accompanying text supra.
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proach, that is exactly the interpretation Judge Adair gave the stat-
ute.
In addition, Judge Adair simply ignored the warning of Con-
gressman Hobbs that the "lawfulness" of the ultimate objective
could not serve as a justification for the use of force to achieve it.127
Congress, however, did apparently heed this admonition in that it
rejected the Celler version which Hobbs said was susceptible to
such a construction.
Nevertheless, Judge Adair concluded that-since obtaining
wages, albeit for unwanted services, was within the defendant's
"rights and responsibilities as a Union representative"' 28-no vio-
lation of the Hobbs Act existed even though violence was used to
achieve that end. Instead, a violation is made out only when the
end itself is "unlawful," as where the union representative is ob-
taining money for his own benefit. 2 9 Thus, on the question of the
"legitimacy" of the end serving as an exoneration of violent means,
Judge Adair was in line with the dissent in Kemble.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed strongly. With respect
to the notion that the Act applied only to a union official's attempt
to obtain money for his own benefit, the Court simply noted that
while the union officials in the Local 807 case were not attempting
to get the money for that purpose, the Congress clearly intended
for the Hobbs Act to proscribe what they were doing. 30 Further-
more, the Court noted that "[t]he legislative history makes clear
that the new Act was meant to eliminate any grounds for future
judicial conclusions that Congress did not intend to cover the em-
ployer-employee relationship"1 3 1 -including, one would presume,
the primary incidents of that relationship, namely the obtaining of
work and the payment of otherwise legitimate wages.
With respect to Judge Adair's reliance on the proviso to the
Hobbs Act which stated that it did not affect any of the several
labor statutes the Court simply noted that: "There is nothing in
any of those Acts, however, that indicates any protection for un-
127. See notes 89-90 & accompanying text supra.
128. 135 F. Supp. at 163.
129. Id. Most of the cases under the Hobbs Act have involved attempts by labor
union officials to extort money for their own personal use. See, e.g., United
States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978);
Anderson v. United States, 262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 867 (1945). In some instances the money
was not obtained through the threatened use of physical violence, but
through the threatened use of "economic force," i.e., otherwise nonactionable
strikes, picketing, and the like. How these cases fit into the conceptual
scheme will be discussed at § II-C of text infra.
130. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1956).
131. Id. at 419 (footnote omitted).
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ions or their officials in attempts to get personal property through
threats of force or violence. Those are not legitimate means for
improving labor conditions. 13 2 The Court footnoted five cases that
presumably illustrated labor conditions or objectives which the la-
bor statutes did not affirmatively permit a union to seek through
"threats of force of violence," and which, therefore, fell within the
parameters of the Hobbs Act when those means are used. Signifi-
cantly, in four of these cases, as in Green itself,13 3 what the unions
were trying to attain was not intrinsically "unlawful" or "illegiti-
mate": In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction
Co. 134 the object was to get employees to join the union and to get
the employer to recognize it as the employees' representative; Al-
len Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board3 5 involved employer accession to the union's contract de-
mand and employee observance of the picket line; NLRB v. Fan-
steel Metallurgical Corp.13 6 dealt with employer recognition of and
negotiation with the union over wages, hours and working condi-
tions; and in Kemble13 7 the object was to get the employer to hire
certain union helpers. Only United States v. Ryan13 8 involved an
objective that was itself illegal-namely, the payment of money by
an employer to the representative of his employees. Thus, it would
seem that in Green, the Supreme Court was concerned with the
use of force and violence to obtain payments, not with the "legiti-
macy" or "illegitimacy" of the payments themselves.
This, certainly, is how the lower courts viewed the matter on
remand. 139 Following the Supreme Court decision, the defendants
asked that the verdict be set aside on the grounds that it was not
supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial judge erred in
refusing to submit a particular instruction to the jury. The instruc-
tion in question would have been to the effect that if the jury finds
that the defendant has a "labor dispute" of a jurisdictional nature
with another union at the time of the alleged threats to compel the
payment of wages to its members for unwanted services, the mat-
ter was beyond the scope of the Hobbs Act. 40
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected that argu-
ment, noting the Supreme Court's admonition that the four labor
132. Id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
133. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
134. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
135. 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
136. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
137. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
138. 350 U.S. 299 (1956).
139. See United States v. Green, 143 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. M1 1956), affd, 246 F.2d 155
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
140. 246 F.2d at 160.
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statutes referred to in the proviso (which do generally regulate "la-
bor disputes") in no way sanction the use of force or violence. The
court added:
We agree with the decisions that this statute encompasses illegal conduct
which may be an outgrowth of a labor dispute just as any other criminal
conduct may result from activity originally lawful. The mere fact that con-
duct originates in exercise of a lawful function does not prevent the ramifi-
cations and extensions thereof from becoming unlawful. 14
1
This exactly reflects the position that Congressman Hobbs took
with respect to the Act. In sum, the Green decision on remand cor-
rectly stands for the proposition that the use of violence or threats
of violence by labor union officials to enforce their demands, re-
gardless of legitimacy, constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.
Despite the Supreme Court's willingness to construe the Hobbs
Act broadly and as intended, judicial hostility to the Hobbs Act
continued to surface. It was conceded that the express congres-
sional reversal of the Local 807 case necessarily meant that Con-
gress intended to include a demand for wages for work not done
within the prohibition of the Act. In addition, the Green case nec-
essarily meant that, at the very least, a demand for wages for un-
wanted work was covered. As one court framed it, the final issue
was whether the Act covered "violence to property as a part of a
plan to extort a thing of value in the form of a collective bargaining
agreement covering wages, hours and working conditions of
wanted employees."'142 The issue was ultimately answered in the
negative. But the path to that result was strewn with unfortunate
distortions of the legislative history and embarrassing contortions
of ordinary logic and semantics.
The first major case to reach the result was United States v.
Caldes.143 Since the United States Supreme Court was to later
speak approvingly of this decision,144 a detailed analysis is in or-
der. First, the court took a narrow view of the disagreement be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court's result in the Local 807
case. It said that Congress thought Local 807 was wrong in recog-
nizing the union member's willingness to work as an excuse for
violence, since this could be construed as also permitting the use
of force to "bring about the hiring of unwanted, unneeded employ-
ees. 1 45  This particular result was predicated solely on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2(a) (the "Wage excep-
tion"), and the fact that "[t] he legislative history of the Hobbs Act
141. Id.
142. United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1972).
143. 457 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1972). See generally Willis, Labor Violence-The Judizci-
ary's Refusal to Apply the Hobbs Act, 28 S.C. L REv. 143 (1976).
144. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 409 (1973).
145. 457 F.2d at 77.
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shows that the deliberate purpose of Congress was to eliminate
Section 2(a)." 146 Thus, the court in Calders reasoned that the pur-
pose of the Hobbs Act was merely to compel a contrary result in
cases like Local 807, where the work is either unperformed or un-
wanted. The court concluded that:
By eliminating Section 2(a) however, Congress did not intend to elimi-
nate traditional labor or union activity, albeit militant, which has as its
object legitimate ends. The exclusion was not meant to provide impunity
to the terroristic and extortionate activities of union members, but to pro-
tect union activity directed toward legitimate labor goals even when mili-
tantly pursued.147
The court then noted that the Green case fell within this pat-
tern, since the purpose of violence there was to obtain wages for
"imposed, unwanted and superflous or fictitious services."'14 The
court also distinguished other lower court cases which had found
that "extortion occurred when a union member tried to foist him-
self or another union member on an employer by threats of force
and violence."' 49
What the court seemed to ignore was that Congress did not
merely repeal the "wage exception" which was the technical basis
of the Local 807 case. Instead, Congress, entirely rewrote the Act
for the express purpose of precluding decisions like that in Local
807.150 This suggests a broad rather than a narrow congressional
overruling of the decision. Given the repeated emphasis in the de-
bates on the element of violence, it is more likely that it was this
aspect of the Local 807 facts that Congress found offensive-not
just the objective to which the violence was directed.
Moreover, euphemisms and pejoratives are no excuse for sound
analysis. Pouring paint on the employer's trucks and the clean
laundry he was delivering, as in Caldes, is no more acceptable
when it is called "militant," (in the court's language) than it is
when it is called "the use of violence against property." At a more
substantive level, the fact that something can be disapprovingly
called "foisting" one's "unwanted and superfluous or fictitious
services" on an employer does not necessarily preclude that con-
duct from also being called a "legitimate labor goal." Thus, the dis-
tinction articulated by the court is totally without substance.
A classic example of this is the Green case. The union there
simply wanted the employer to hire union members to scout ahead
of bulldozers and warn the drivers of approaching pitfalls; the em-
ployer felt that this was an unnecessary precaution. But whatever
146. Id. at 76.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 77.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See notes 69-71 & accompanying text supra.
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the dis-economies of the situation, this kind of job acquisition and
work sharing among union members is a traditional, legitimate,
and otherwise entirely legal objective and purpose of American la-
bor unions.151 Stated differently, it was as legitimate for the union
in Green to want to induce the employer to hire an additional man
to walk in front of the bulldozer as it was for the union in Caldes to
want to induce the employer to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement. In short, the court really did not succeed in distin-
guishing the violence in the case before it from the violence in
Green-not, at least, by reference to the alleged "legitimacy" of the
goal.
The court, however, attempted to justify its distinction on an-
other basis. It noted that the language of the Hobbs Act was de-
rived from the New York extortion statute, and under that statute
strikes and picketing had been found not to constitute "extortion"
if the purpose was to accomplish some legitimate labor objective,
such as organization; but such conduct was actionable when
merely "used as a pressure device to exact the payment of money
as a condition of its cessation."' 52 The Hobbs Act had been simi-
larly construed, the court noted, in a case where a labor leader had
threatened to call a strike unless the employer paid him some
"under the table" money.153 From this the court apparently con-
cluded that the illegitimacy of the objective is always a necessary
element in a Hobbs Act violation. This reasoning, however, is falla-
cious.
The distinction adopted by the New York cases with respect to
strikes can be understood only in a historical perspective. 5 4 At
one time in the history of American labor law, under the so-called
151. Although the Labor Management Relations Act §8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (6) (1976) contains a so-called "anti-featherbedding" provision, it
would not prohibit the kind of conduct that was involved in Green. In Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Assoc. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953), the Court
noted that the LMRA "limits its condemnation to instances where a labor
organization or its agents exact pay from an employer in return for services
not performed or not to be performed." Id. at 110. This conclusion is bol-
stered by Senator Taft's observation that although the Senate did not ap-
prove of featherbedding in the broader sense, it "felt that it was impractical to
give a board or a court the power to say that so many men are all right, and so
many men are too many." 93 CONG. REC. 6441 (1947). Moreover, a demand for
the kind of work that was involved in Green would not only be a legitimate
subject of bargaining, but also a mandatory one. As the Court in American
Newspaper Publishers put it, the Act "leaves to collective bargaining the de-
termination of what, if any, work, including bona fide 'made work,' shall be
included as compensable services." 345 U.S. at 111.
152. 457 F.2d at 78.
153. United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1966).
154. See generally T. HAGGARD, COMPULsORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE
CouRTs 11-24 (1977), which contains, from a slightly different perspective, a
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"conspiracy doctrine," strikes and picketing were sometimes said
to be inherently coercive, because of the economic injury-in-fact
that they caused the person to whom they were directed. How-
ever, even before the matter was almost totally preempted by fed-
eral statutory law, some of the common law courts had moved
considerably away from that position and had adopted a
"means/ends" approach. This approach declared the concerted
activities of labor to be actionable or coercive only if they involved
either "unlawful means"--conduct which was itself criminal, tor-
tious, or perhaps even in breach of contract-or "unlawful ends"--
a term capable of being construed as including almost anything a
judge might find to be offensive.
Although this approach is certainly no longer the primary de-
vice for measuring the legality of strikes (that function having
been assumed by the various federal labor statutes), ghosts of the
theory do sometimes emerge in analgous contexts where the issue
is whether an otherwise peaceful strike or picketing falls within
the purview of some general statute prohibiting "acts of force" or
"coercion." In such a case, if a violation exists at all it must neces-
sarily be because the objective itself is unlawful or illegitimate.
The New York case, relied on by the Caldes court, 55 held that
the otherwise peaceful picketing (the "means") became a coercive
exercise of force only when the objective shifted from attempting
to organize the employer (a legitimate "ends") to obtaining money
from him as a condition of stopping the strike (an illegitimate
"ends"). However, if this holding was merely a reflection of the
historically pervasive "means/ends" theory of coercion, it becomes
readily apparent that one cannot deduce from it what the Caldes
court deduced-namely, that no strike can be considered coercive
unless the ends are illegitimate. To the contrary, under the
"means/ends" approach a violent strike is coercive regardless of
its objective; and there is nothing in the New York case to suggest
otherwise. Thus, the Caldes court's reliance on that authority was
misplaced.
Finally, at the policy level, the Caldes court simply noted that
labor unions should be allowed great latitude in pursuing the inter-
ests of their members and that "[t]he expansive interpretation of
'extortion' used in the Hobbs Act as urged by the Government
would make criminal the activities of many militant labor organi-
zations.' 56 The court contended, for example, that a strike in vio-
lation of a contractual no-strike clause would be a "'wrongful' use
comprehensive overview of the evolution of the "criminal conspiracy" doc-
trine.
155. People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
156. 457 F.2d at 78.
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of force"' 57 and thus, constitute criminal conduct under the Gov-
ernment's view. This is a somewhat puzzling assertion, since it
would seem that a strike in violation of a "no-strike" clause would
also be a violation under the court's approach. The objective of
such conduct certainly could not be denominated a "legitimate la-
bor goal"; thus, by analogy to the New York cases, a strike to ob-
tain that objective could be considered "coercive" and, therefore, a
violation of the Hobbs Act.
As a second example of the possible overbreadth of the Govern-
ment's approach, the court noted that "[s]pontaneous and
sporadic fighting on the picket lines could also be condemned as
the use of wrongful force and as extortion if [the Government's]
view was allowed to prevail."' 58 The court then indicated that in
the year following passage of the Hobbs Act Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act, containing "specific provisions which condemned
this action as unfair labor practices."' 59 Furthermore, the court
noted that during the debates on the Taft-Hartley Act, "no con-
gressman expressed an opinion that the Hobbs Act of the preced-
ing year covered union violence while a strike was in progress."' 60
The court's reasoning here is both obscure and factually incor-
rect. In the first place, the section of the Taft-Hartley Act to which
the court specifically referred primarily prohibits secondary boy-
cotts or union attempts to require a neutral employer to stop doing
business with the employer with whom the union has a dispute.161
Although violence can occur in connection with such boycotts, it is
certainly not a necessary element of the offense. Moreover, even if
violence did occur in a specific situation, the objective of a secon-
dary boycott is to force the victim to stop doing business with
someone else, not to force him to pay the union money or anything
else of value, as is required in order for the crime of extortion to
exist. In short, what the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited and what the
Government in the Caldes case claimed that the Hobbs Act pro-
hibited were two entirely different things. Thus, even if there had
been no mention of the Hobbs Act during the Taft-Hartley Act de-
bates, this would have in no way shown that the Government's in-
terpretation of the Hobbs Act was overly broad.
As a matter of fact, however, the court was simply wrong in sug-
gesting that during the Taft-Hartley Act debates no one referred to









cerned. In addition to making secondary boycotts, organizational
picketing, and jurisdictional disputes unfair labor practices, the
Taft-Hartley Act gave federal courts jurisdiction over private dam-
age suits brought by a person injured as a result of such conduct.
Senator Aiken, however, wanted to add an amendment which
would also allow for injunctive relief in certain situations. He was
specifically concerned with the small farmer who could not deliver
his produce because of a labor dispute at the market, and for
whom a damage action would be impractical. Senator Pepper, in
discussing the proposed amendment said: "I do not recall exactly
the terms of it, but last year we passed the Hobbs bill, the so-called
antiracketeering bill, which gave jurisdiction to the federal court to
act with respect to interruptions of and interference with people
delivering their goods, in the way I think the Senator from Ver-
mont has in mind."'162 Senator Aiken, however, responded:
It has developed that the Hobbs bill was not worth the paper upon which
it was written, so far as affording any protection to the farmer was con-
cerned, because the farmer is not molested in taking his crop to the mar-
ket, but when he arrives there may find that the commission man has an
agreement for a closed shop, and the farmer cannot unload his produce,
and therefore is turned back.1
63
Discounting the hyperbole, Senator Aiken was saying that the
Hobbs Act is inadequate to solve the problem totally because it
only applies to situations where the farmer has been "molested."
The restraints upon delivery that are caused by certain kinds of
agreements, secondary boycotts or jurisdictional strikes cause just
as real an injury to the farmer, but are not covered by the Hobbs
Act. However, the correlative of his statement is that the Hobbs
Act does, in fact, cover acts of "molestation," including those that
occur in connection with union activities that were, at the time he
made this statement, not otherwise illegal under the existing labor
statutes. In short, it would seem that the 1947 Congress was aware
that the Hobbs Act applied to acts of violence aimed at achieving
ends which were not otherwise illegal. This would tend to support
the Government's position in the Caldes case rather than refute it.
In summarizing its overbreadth argument, the court noted that
"it appears to us that acts of vandalism of the type committed by
these appellants would be more properly and suitably prosecuted
in the state courts and it is doubtful if Congress intended ... to
elevate this type of conduct to the level of the federal court."'1
The opponents of the Hobbs Act, of course, made exactly the same
kind of assertion.165 However, it was of no moment to the Caldes
162. 93 CONG. REC. 4860 (1947).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. 457 F.2d at 79.
165. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REc. 3201, 3225 (1943); 91 CONG. REC. 11901 (1945).
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court that the majority of Congress apparently felt otherwise.
As specious as the reasoning in the Caldes case was, the same
result was eventually reached by the United States Supreme
Court without any firmer basis insofar as legislative history or
analysis is concerned. In United States v. Enmons,166 the defend-
ants were indicted for firing high-powered rifles at three utility
company transformers, draining the oil from a company trans-
former, and blowing up a transformer substation owned by the
company-all done for the purpose of obtaining higher wages and
other employment benefits from the company for the striking em-
ployees. The indictment was, however, dismissed by the district
court on the theory that the Hobbs Act did not prohibit the use of
violence in obtaining "legitimate" union objectives. 167 On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, advancing four separate justifications
for its conclusion.
First, the Court focused on the fact that the statute prohibited
only the "wrongful" use of force to obtain property.168 The Court
noted that Congressman Hobbs intended the term "wrongful" to
modify the entire section;169 if it modified only the term "force" it
would be redundant because any force to obtain property is wrong-
ful. Therefore, the Court concluded that "'wrongful' has meaning
in the Act only if it limits the statute's coverage to those instances
where the obtaining of the property would itself be 'wrongful' be-
cause the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that prop-
erty."'170 The Court then added: "Construed in this fashion, the
Hobbs Act has properly been held to reach instances where union
officials threatened force or violence against an employer in order
to obtain personal payoffs, and where unions used the proscribed
means to exact 'wage' payments from employers in return for 'im-
posed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious services' of work-
ers."'
7 1
There are a number of things critically wrong with the Court's
reasoning. First, the dilemma posed by the Court-"either con-
strue the Act this way or make it redundant"-is essentially false
since there are other possible interpretations. For example, one
court of appeals previously suggested that "wrongful" referred to
conduct constituting a breach of the peace in contrast to merely
166. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
167. United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. La. 1971), afd, 410 U.S. 396
(1973).
168. Specifically, the Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from an-
other, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence or fear .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1976) (emphasis added).
169. 410 U.S. at 399 n.2.
170. Id. at 400.
171. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tortious conduct.17 2 This interpretation gives the term "wrongful"
a meaning as a modifier of the term "force" that is certainly as rea-
sonable as the interpretation suggested by the Supreme Court.
A more compelling explanation of the intended meaning of the
term "wrongful" can, however, be found through a thoughtful read-
ing of the legislative history. As previously indicated, many of the
opponents of the Hobbs Act were fearful that the Act would be
construed to prohibit legitimate strikes and picketing.173 Some of
them even suggested that a strike is, by definition, the assertion of
a form of force. 174 The Hobbs Act proponents answered, of course,
that the right to strike was protected by various federal labor stat-
utes; that the rights affirmatively guaranteed by those statutes
were not taken away by the Hobbs Act; but that there was nothing
in those statutes which gave unions the right to use violence in the
course of the exercise of the right to strike.175
It is against this background that Congressman Hobbs asser-
tion that the term "wrongful" "qualifies the entire section" must be
viewed.176 Congressman Voorhis, who was not an enthusiastic
supporter of the bill, wanted to make sure that a simple threat to
go on strike for higher wages would not be construed as extortion
under the Act. He was advised that it would not. He then immedi-
ately asked the additional question, "Does the word 'wrongful' ap-
ply to entire section?"' 77 Presumably he wanted to make doubly
sure that a peaceful strike would also not be considered wrongful
under the Hobbs Act. Congressman Hobbs, in response to the
question, then said that term wrongful "qualifies the entire sec-
tion.' 78 Congressman Hobbs undoubtedly intended this state-
ment to assuage Congressman Voorhis' fears that the Act,
notwithstanding the proviso, might be so broadly construed as to
prohibit even peaceful strikes. In other words, Congressman
Hobbs was saying that even if strikes are considered a form of co-
ercion or force, they are not "wrongful force" unless accompanied
by violence. This interpretation easily removes the redundancy
which so concerned the Court.
172. Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915
(1955).
173. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REc. 3194, 3218 (1943); 91 CONG. REC. 11901 (1945).
174. Congressman LaFollette, fdr example, said that "[o]f course, there is an ele-
ment of coercion in strikes. It is the only right labor has." 91 CONG. REC.
11920 (1945).
175. See 89 CONG. REC. 3193, 3202 (1943); 91 CONG. REC. 11904-05 (1945).
176. This assertion, and other matters summarized in the text, occured in the
course of remarks among Congressmen Voorhis, Sumners, and Hobbs, re-





Even if the Court correctly concluded that the operative effect
of the term "wrongful" in the statute is to identify the objective
toward which the force must be directed in order for it to consti-
tute extortion, the Court's reasoning on this point is still subject to
question. It is based on the strange assumption that a person has
no "lawful claim" to wages which are paid for unwanted services,
as in the Green case, but that he does have such a claim to wages
higher than those the employer would voluntarily pay in the ab-
sence of force "in return for genuine services which the employer
seeks,"'1 7 9 as in the Enmons case. However, the distinction is ana-
lytically vacuous. A person has a no more "lawful claim" to work
at $5.00 an hour for an employor who wants to pay only $4.75 than
does another person who wants to work for an employer who does
not want this person's services at all. In either case, the would-be
employee's "lawful claim" to wages is dependent upon the em-
ployer's voluntary or noncoerced agreement to pay such wages.
Nevertheless, on the basis on a non-existent distinction, the Court
would apply the statute in one case but not the other.
The Court's second justification is somewhat related to this lat-
ter point; the Court simply claimed that "[t] he legislative frame-
work of the Hobbs Act dispels any ambiguity in the wording of the
statute and makes it clear that the Act does not apply to the use of
force to achieve legitimate labor ends.'u8 0 To support this ex-
traordinary proposition, the Court first relied on the fact that Con-
gress undoubtedly wanted to overrule the Local 807 case which
had permitted union members to "use their protected status to ex-
act payments from employers for imposed, unwanted, and super-
fluous services"' 8 1 -presumably not a "legitimate" labor objective,
although the Court does not explain why. Assuming that overrul-
ing that aspect of the Local 807 case was the limited intent of Con-
gress, the Court then inferred an intent not to prohibit violence in
the pursuit of "legitimate" objectives. In support of this conclu-
sion, the Court referred to several assertions made during the de-
bates to the effect that the bill was not intended to interfere "with
any legitimate activity on the part of labor people or labor un-
ions."'182
This chain of reasoning is weak at almost every link. For exam-
ple, the Court did not provide an objective basis for distinguishing
"legitimate" labor goals from '1llegitimate" ones-a basis which
could be used to differentiate the objectives being pursued by the
union in Green from those being pursued by the labor union in
179. 410 U.S. at 400.
180. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 403.
182. Id. at 404 (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 11908 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Sumners)).
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Enmons.183 In neither case were the objectives independently ille-
gal, that is, illegal regardless of the means used to achieve them.
Also, while it is undoubtedly true that Congress intended to re-
verse the Local 807 case, an impartial reading of the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress was at least as concerned with the
means that were being used in that case as it was with the ultimate
objective being pursued. Finally, the statements relied upon by
the Court to the effect that the Act would not affect "legitimate"
labor activity must be construed in pari materia with the more
specific assurances that this result would be accomplished by the
proviso guaranteeing that the existing labor statutes would not be
modified or repealed. This guarantee was, however, tempered by
the repeated reminder that these statutes in no way gave labor un-
ions the right to use force or violence. 184
In short, from conclusion that the Act was not intended to pro-
hibit "legitimate" labor activities, one simply cannot infer that the
legitimacy of the objective justifies whatever means are used to
achieve it.
The inference not only does not flow from the legislative his-
tory; indeed, it is affirmatively contradicted by it. Congressman
Hobbs' single objection to Congressman Celler's amendment was
that it would allow conduct which was aimed at "lawful" ends to
escape the prohibitions of the Act even though the conduct itself
was "unlawful."'185 By rejecting the Celler amendment, Congress
necessarily also rejected the interpretation given to the Act by the
Supreme Court in Enmons: that the legitimacy of the ends sought
remove whatever means are used to achieve them from the
prohibitions of the statute. Furthermore, while the Court was cor-
rect in saying that the Celler amendment was rejected because it
"would have operated to continue the effect of the Local 807
case, ' 186 the Court was grossly incorrect in asserting that it was
done "solely"'1 7 for that reason, and that "undoing the restrictive
impact of that case"'188 merely means that violence directed at
otherwise "illegitimate" ends is now illegal under federal law. To
183. In Enmons, the objective of the violence was simply to obtain a more
favorable collective bargaining agreement, an obviously legitimate goal in it-
self, while in Green the objective was to obtain job opportunities for union
members, a similarly legitimate and entirely traditional goal of the labor
movement. Cf. United States v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1957)
("There is no doubt that unions have the right to settle disputes [such as the
one involved in that case] peacefully by means of negotiation .... "); see
also note 151 supra.
184. See notes 173-78 & accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 89-90 & accompanying text supra.





the contrary, it would appear that the legislative overruling of Lo-
cal 807 had a much broader purpose.
The only specific language in the legislative history from which
the Court could derive support for its interpretation was a single,
obscure dialogue between Congressman Marcantonio and
Hobbs.189 However, as was previously discussed,19 that exchange
cannot be construed as a condonation by Hobbs of violence di-
rected toward achieving a "legitimate" end. The Court's reliance
on this exchange in support of its interpretation of the statute is
unwarranted if not totally misplaced.
The third justification advanced by the Court scarcely deserves
mention. The Court simply noted that "[iun the nearly three dec-
ades that have passed since the enactment of the Hobbs Act, no
reported case has upheld the theory that the Act proscribes the
use of force to achieve legitimate collective-bargaining de-
mands."'u 9 The Courti without explanation, here cited Green and
Kemble as cases allegedly involving "illegitimate" labor demands,
and cited Caldes as a case involving "legitimate" labor demands
where the indictment was properly dismissed. These cases, how-
ever, are either unpersuasive or simply not supportive of the
Court's theory.
Nevertheless, from all this the Court concluded that Congress
did not intend to legislate the manner in which labor enforced its
various demands, since "[i]t is unlikely that if Congress had in-
deed wrought such a major expansion of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion in enacting the Hobbs Act, its action would have so passed
unobserved."' 92 To say the least, this is a rather novel theory of
statutory interpretation and one certainly not adhered to in other
contexts. 19
3
Finally, in justifying its narrow interpretation of the Hobbs Act,
the Court trotted out its "parade of horribles." The Government's
theory, the Court said:
[W]ould cover all overtly coercive conduct in the course of an economic
strike, obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce. The worker who
threw a punch on a picket line, or the striker who deflated the tires on his
employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act prosecution and the
possibility of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 flne.194
189. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
191. 410 U.S. at 408.
192. Id. at 410.
193. For example, it apparently "passed unobserved" for roughly a hundred years
that in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 Congress intended to prohibit purely pri-
vate as well as public discrimination. However, this did not prevent the
Court from so holding in the first case where the issue was squarely
presented. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
194. 410 U.S. at 410 (footnotes omitted).
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In the first place, as has been suggested before, a reasonable
interpretation of the Hobbs Act need not include within its ambit
all violence connected with a strike; in many instances either the
victim or the purpose is different than would be required in order
to constitute "extortion."' 95 Moreover, if it is unlikely that Con-
gress intended to severely punish a person who slices tires in the
course of a strike to obtain $.50 more per hour, it is certainly no
more likely that Congress intended to impose such punishment
when that particular conduct occurs in the course of a strike to
obtain additional but unwanted work for union members; yet that
result could be reached even under the Court's theory. There is, in
short, simply no logical relationship between the Court's concern
over excessive punishments and its theory that the Act should
therefore be limited to conduct having an "illegitimate" objective.
In addition, the Court apparently lost sight of the fact that the
Hobbs Act, like many other statutes, merely establishes the maxi-
mum possible punishments. While it is true that the opponents of
the Hobbs Act thought these sanctions might be potentially exces-
sive if applied to the so-called "milder" forms of labor violence, 196
the majority in Congress either felt otherwise or knew that judges
would exercise the discretion inherent in their function and mold
the punishment to fit the crime. 197 In any event, the Court's con-
cern that an overzealous tire slasher might be fined to the point of
impoverishment and incarcerated for the better part of his life is
neither a necessary nor even a proper basis for construing the stat-
ute the way the Court did.
In sum, none of the reasons advanced by the Court for its read-
ing of the statute can withstand hard analysis. The Court's distor-
tion of the legislative history is particularly disturbing, and it was
primarily this that led Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, to state:
At times, the legislative history of a measure is so clouded or obscure that
we must perforce give some meaning to vague words. But where, as here,
the consensus of the House is so clear, we should carry out its purpose no
matter how distasteful or undesirable that policy may be to us .... 198
The purpose, which Mr. Justice Douglas found evident from a
careful review of the legislative history, was simply that "[t] he re-
gime of violence, whatever its precise objective, is a common device
195. See text following note 109 supra.
196. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REc. 3201 (1943), where Congressman Celler voiced the
concern that the bill may permit simple assaults to be converted into felo-
nies.
197. See Livers v. United States, 185 F.2d 807, 809 (6th Cir. 1950) ("In the enact-
ment of our national laws against crime, the Congress has vested United
States District Judges with wide discretion in assessing punishment within
the limits of the various federal statutes.").
198. 410 U.S. at 418 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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of extortion and is condemned by the Act."'199 With respect to the
majority's position, he bluntly but correctly observed that "[t] he
Court today achieves by interpretation what those who were op-
posed to the Hobbs Act were unable to get Congress to do." 20 0
C. Current Ambiguities in the Law
Although the Enmons decision resolved the specific issue that
was before the Court, the opinion at the same time created two
glaring points of uncertainty. First, the Court's holding that the
Act does not apply to the enforcement of "legitimate" union de-
mands leaves open the question of what exactly an "illegitimate"
union demand might be. At the very least, if the sought-after pay-
ment would itself be illegal, whether obtained through force or
otherwise, a demand for such payment would potentially be within
the purview of the Hobbs Act even under the Enmons decision.
This would appear to cover certain proscribed payments by an em-
ployer to any representative of his employees, 2 01 as well as em-
ployer payments into pension funds, check-off payments, and
other such payments when not done according to the strict man-
dates of the law.202 Arguably, the payment of wages in excess of
either mandatory wage guidelines or the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement containing a no-strike clause could be included
as well. True "featherbedding" would almost certainly be consid-
ered a proscribed objective.20 3 An employer's requirement that his
employees pay union dues in the absence of a valid union security
agreement or each individual's voluntary agreement to pay would
also seem to qualify,204 as would the illegal recognition of a
union.205
More troublesome, however, are those objectives which are not
intrinsically "unlawful" but which are, nevertheless, susceptible to
being called "illegitimate." The existance of this category is a nec-
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 413.
201. See United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
955 (1976). Under the circumstances of that case, the payment of the money
was itself thought by the court to be an independent violation of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976), which generally prohibits payments by
an employer to the representative of his employees, thus making it an "ille-
gitimate" objective under the Enmons approach.
202. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (4) & (5) (1976) (pertaining to payments made
under check-off authorizations and employer contribution into pension
funds).
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (6) (1976); United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609
(7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Callahan, 551 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1977).
204. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).




essary, though perhaps unintended, 2 6 corollary of the fact that the
Court in Enmons clearly reaffirmed the Green decision. In point of
fact, the objective of the union in Green was not independently un-
lawful. Although the union may have been seeking wages for serv-
ices which the employer felt he did not need, the union members
were apparently willing to actually do the work, and thus Green
was not a true case of "featherbedding" in the statutory sense.2 07
What other kinds of "illegitimate" but not unlawful objectives the
Court might have in mind is subject only to speculation.20 8
As has been shown, one source of ambiguity stems from the
Court's conclusion in Enmons that "illegitimacy" of the objective is
a necessary element of a Hobbs Act offense. Another ambiguity
which the decision creates is whether physical force or violence is
also a necessary element. Under prior case law it clearly was not.
One of the recurring issues in the cases involving demands for per-
sonal payoffs to union officials was whether such demands, when
backed merely by threats of strikes, picketing, or other presumably
peaceful "labor difficulties," could constitute extortion under the
Hobbs Act, or whether either actual force or threatened force was
required. The courts had consistently held that "[r] easonable fear
of economic loss was enough to come'within the statute."20 9 The
court in United States v. Varlack 210 explained:
[I]t is. . .clear that it was not the intention of the Congress to interfere
with the exertion of peaceful economic pressures by a union through the
medium of strikes to achieve legitimate labor objectives. But it does not
follow ... that only violence or threats of violence are covered by the Act
and that the Act is not violated when union leaders or representatives ob-
tain... personal enrichment by using their... influence to instill in the
minds of the employers with whom they deal a fear of work stoppages or
the prolongation of strikes.
2 1 1
206. The Court may have simply misread the Green decision, for there is some
suggestion in the opinion that the Court viewed the facts in Green as sub-
stantially similar to those in the Local 807 case. See 410 U.S. at 408. This,
however, is not accurate in that, in at least some instances, the union mem-
bers in Local 807 did not even offer to do any work, thus making it a case of
true "featherbedding," and, under current law at least, an illegitimate union
objective. See note 151 supra. There was no suggestion of that in Green.
207. See note 151 supra; see also, United States v. McCullough, 427 F. Supp. 246
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
208. In United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1977), a non-labor case,
members of a certain Indian tribe were indicted for attempting to obtain
money from a railroad to redress past wrongs against the tribe. Payment by
the railroad would not, of course, have been illegal, and they alleged that
their belief in the validity of their claim was sufficient to bring them within
the Enmons exception. The Court of Appeals disagreed. "To say that the
pursuit.of a payment from the railroad for alleged past wrongs is not wrong-
ful taxes the statutory language to a highly unreasonable degree." Id. at 730.
209. United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 575-76 (3d Cir. 1958).
210. 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955).
211. Id. at 669.
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Thus, the case law seemed to stand for the symmetrical propo-
sition that it was extortion if either the ends or the means were
independently illegal.2 12 By requiring an "illegitimate" objective
in every case, Enmons necessarily destroyed this formulation, but
it is not clear what the decision provides by way of substitution.
There are two alternatives: Actual legality of the means used is no
longer a relevant factor at all, thus making the 'illegitimacy" of the
ends both a necessary and a sufficient condition of the violation; or
both illegitimate ends and otherwise illegal means (violence or
threats of violence) are now necessary for a violation of the Act.
The Court's statement in a footnote to its discussion of the term
"wrongful," in Enmons is relevant to this issue:
The Government suggests a convoluted construction of "wrongful." It
concedes that when the means used are not "wrongful," such as where
fear of economic loss from a strike is employed, then the objective must be
illegal. If, on the other hand, "wrongful" force and violence are used, even
for a legal objective, the Government contends that the statute is satis-
fied.2
13
The Government's theory was, of course, consistent with the ei-
ther/or proposition suggested above. In this footnote the Court
was clearly rejecting the proposition that the means alone can
render a demand illegal. Whether they were also rejecting the
proposition that the ends alone can render a demand illegal, is
only problematical. That such was not the Court's intent can per-
haps be deduced from the fact that the Court also said that "the
Hobbs Act has properly been held to reach instances where union
officials threatened force or violence against an employer in order
to obtain personal payoffs .... -214 The Court here cited three
lower court cases which stand unequivocally for the proposition
that fear of economic loss, brought about by otherwise peaceful
and not illegal strikes or picketing, can rise to the level of extortion
under the Hobbs Act, provided the end being sought is itself an
illegitimate one.2 15 Presumably, the Supreme Court was of the
same view.
On the other hand, there is specific language in the legislative
history to suggest that the typical "shake down," where a union
official uses his power to call or prolong strikes as a form of threat
212. Comment, Featherbedding and the Federal AntiRacketeering Act, 26 U. CH.
L. REV. 150, 159 (1958).
213. 410 U.S. at 400 n.3.
214. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
215. United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kramer,
355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.), cert. granted and case remanded for resentencing, 384
U.S. 100 (1966); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 915 (1955).
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to induce an employer to make personal payoffs, is not extortion in
the statutory sense. Presumably, Congress intended to not involve
itself through the Hobbs Act in otherwise peaceful strikes and
picketing. In dialogue supporting this proposition, Congressman
Sumner stated: "There have been complaints that in the case of
strikes an attorney has gone in and asked an operator something
like $15,000 or $20,000 as a shakedown to stop a strike. Is there any-
thing in this bill about that?"2 16 Congressman Jennings re-
sponded: "Not a thing. This does not have a thing in the world to
do with strikes. '217
Since Enmons, there have been a number of cases where the
courts have indicated that union officials can be convicted for ex-
torting money or other benefits through threats of "economic
harm" to an employer.2 18 Apparently, the implications of Enmons
on this issue and the significance of that bit of legislative history
have not been discussed. This, however, is a matter of some con-
cern. Where the end is affirmatively illegal, as in the personal
payoff situations, perhaps the threatened use of economic force
can be called "extortion" without doing undue violence to the
term. However, where the "illegality" flows from the fact that the
objective is inconsistent with a previously agreed to contract term,
one begins to get a little uneasy. Is it proper to make it a "crime"
to strike to achieve such an objective? Regardless of one's judg-
ment on this question, it is quite another matter to label as "extor-
tion" the threatened use of otherwise peaceful and legal economic
force for the purpose of achieving an end which is itself merely
"illegitimate," as in the Green case. Although it seems unlikely
that anyone would ever be convicted of extortion for striking in
order to require a railroad to hire a "fireman" for a diesel locomo-
tive, such a result flows logically from the Enmons decision. This
is because the Court in Enmons characterized the objective of the
union in Green as being "illegitimate" even though it was not in
fact affirmatively illegal, and suggested that the use of economic
force with respect to such ends can be considered extortionate. On
the other hand, if the Court did not intend that result, one is neces-
sarily left with the conclusion that the theoretical underpinnings of
Enmons are hopelessly ambiguous. In either event, some clarifica-
tion by the Court is certainly in order.
216. 91 CONG. REC. 11912 (1945).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645




At the time of the Enmons decisions, revisions to the Hobbs Act
were already in the process of formulation. In 1966, Congress cre-
ated the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws,2 1 9 commonly called the "Brown Commission" after its chair-
man, Edmund G. Brown, former Governor of California. The man-
date of this Commission was to study the existing body of federal
criminal laws, including the Hobbs Act, and to make recommenda-
tions to Congress for revision and recodification. In 1971 the Com-
mission submitted its final report, consisting primarily of a
proposed draft of a federal criminal code with brief comments for
each section.2 20 Under this code, extortion, a separate offense
under the Hobbs Act, was simply treated as a form of theft. Sec-
tion 1732 provided that: "A person is guilty of theft if he: ... (b)
knowingly obtains the property of another by deception or by
threat with intent to deprive the owner thereof, or intentionally de-
prives another of his property by deception or by threat ... "221
Section 1741 further provided that
'threat' means an expressed purpose, however communicated, to (i) cause
bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person;
or (ii) cause damage to property; or (iii) subject the person threatened or
to any other person to physical confinement or restraint... or (x) bring
about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective action to
obtain property or deprive another of his property which is not demanded
or received for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to repre-
sent or (xi) cause anyone to be dismissed from his employment, unless
the property is demanded or obtained for lawful union purposes .... 222
Part (x) of the definition stated that a strike or boycott which is
not for the purpose of obtaining benefits for the whole group, as in
the typical "payoff" or "shakedown" situation, is to be considered
illegal. Presumably this is true even though the strike or boycott is
an otherwise peaceful one. It also seems clear from the structure
of the definition that violence intended to coerce the settlement of
a strike (i.e., causing bodily injury, property damage, or physical
restraint to obtain an otherwise legitimate group benefit) is also
illegal. Finally, as the comments to this section of the draft make
clear, part (xi) was clearly designed to exclude from the coverage
of the section any threatened or actual enforcement of a union se-
curity agreement as long as the dues received under threat of dis-
219. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of July 8,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44.
220. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Part I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Part I].
221. Id. at 359.
222. Id. at 373-74.
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charge were used for lawful union purposes.2 2 3 Thus, the Brown
Commission draft would not have accomplished any major
changes in the Hobbs Act as it had been construed before Enmons.
The Brown Committee report was submitted to Congress,
where it was referred to the Senate and House Comnittees on the
Judiciary and to the President, who created a Criminal Code Revi-
sion Unit within the Department of Justice for further study and
revision. The Senate Committee's end product, after two years of
hearings, was bill S. 1,224 introduced by Senators McClellan,
Hruska and Ervin on January 4, 1973.225 Although it was derived
from the Brown Committee draft, S. 1 differed from that draft in
many ways. With respect to the extortion provisions, S. 1 opted in
favor of a return to the carefully hammered out language of the
existing Hobbs Act. Section 2-9C3 provided that: "A person is
guilty of extortion if he intentionally obtains services or property
of another from another person, with the consent of the other per-
son, where such consent is induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official
right."2 26
The section-by-section explanation of S. 1 simply stated that
"[t]he language is taken from [section] 1951 to carry forward its
judicial construction, ' 22 7 presumably including, insofar as
Supreme Court cases are concerned, the Green decision. It is sig-
nificant to note that the Enmons decision, appearing on February
22, 1973, had not been handed down at the time this explanation
was written.
In the meantime, the Criminal Code Revision Unit of the Jus-
tice Department had also been working on a draft criminal code. S.
1400228 was introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan on
March 27, 1973229 after Enmons had been rendered, and was clearly
drafted with the intent of repudiating the decision. Section 1722(a)
provided that: "A person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly
obtains property of another by force, or by threatening or placing
another person in fear that any person will be subjected to bodily
223. Id. at 374.
224. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hear-
ings on S. 1, S. 716, S. 1400, S. 1401 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part V, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4211-748 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Part 1].
225. 119 CONG. REC. 92 (1973).
226. Hearings, Part V, supra note 224, at 4346.
227. Id. at 4786.
228. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), Hearings, Part V, supra note 224, at 4862-
5197.
229. 119 CoNG. REc. 9634 (1973).
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injury or kidnapping or that any property will be damaged."23 0 The
explanation to this section of the bill said that it was "worded to
overcome the adverse effects of a recent Supreme Court opinion
construing the legislative intent as to one aspect of the existing
statute in an unusually restrictive manner."23 1 Presumably, the
authors of S. 1400 believed that they accomplished this by the
omission of the word "wrongful" in the definition of the crime,
since the rationale of the Enmons decision hangs fairly heavily on
the presence of that word in the Hobbs Act.
Hearings were subsequently held on all three versions of a pro-
posed federal criminal code-the Brown Commission draft, S. 1,
and S. 1400. On January 15, 1975, Senator McClellan, for himself
and several other Senators, introduced a new S. 1232 which incor-
porated elements of all three of the proposals. Significantly, this S.
1 adopted the language of S. 1400 insofar as extortion was con-
cerned, and the draft report clearly indicated that the Subcommit-
tee intended to overrule the Enmons decision.23 3 Some doubt was
expressed, however, as to whether the language used was capable
of having that effect. A statement by the Associated Builders and
Contractors suggested that in order to make the matter clear the
following be added after the final word "damaged" in section
1722(a): "Notwithstanding that the same acts or conduct may also
be a violation of state or local law, and notwithstanding that such
acts or conduct were used in the course of a legitimate labor dis-
pute or in the pursuit of legitimate union or labor ends or objec-
tives. ' 2 34 The second S. 1, with some amendments, was reported
by the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures to the full
Committee on the Judiciary on October 21, 1975, where the bill was
allowed to die.
The next step was taken on May 2, 1977, when Senators McClel-
lan and Kennedy introduced S. 1437,235 the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1977.23 6 This bill allegedly represented a compromise on
several controversial and important points, the lack of agreement
on which had kept prior bills from moving through the legislative
230. Hearings, Part V, supra note 224, at 5966.
231. Id. at 4847.
232. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
233. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., DRAFT REPORT TO
AccoMPANY S. 1 644-59 (Comm. Print 1975).
234. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. I Before the Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, Part XII, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1975).
235. 123 CONG. REC. S6831 (daily ed. May 2, 1977).
236. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws:
Hearings on S. 1437 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part XIII, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9485-792 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Part XIII].
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process. The extortion offense, however, was again simply defined,
as obtaining property of another "(1) by threatening or placing an-
other person in fear that any person will be subjected to bodily
injury or kidnapping or that any property will be damaged; or (2)
under color of official right."237
The Committee Report on S. 1437238 contains an excellent sum-
mary of the then existing law with respect to extortion under the
Hobbs Act and indicates approval of the judicial decisions holding
that "fear" under the statute applies not only to fear of physical
violence but also fear of economic harm to the victim's property or
business. Moreover, the report is unequivocal in its repudiation of
the Enmons "legitimate objectives" rationale. Noting that such an
exception had not been recognized with respect to extortion by
other persons, the Committee felt that labor union officials were
not entitled to such a privileged treatment.
The thrust of an extortion statute should be to punish violent extortionate
means to obtain the property of another regardless of the legality of the
ends sought, and this principle should apply in the collective bargaining
context as well as elsewhere. Thus, an employer who blows up a union
office or causes a union official to be assaulted in order to instill fear and
thereby obtain property of the union ought to be guilty under the Act irre-
spective of whether the property could have been obtained lawfully
through collective bargaining. And the same should be true in the reverse
situation. Accordingly, the Committee has proposed in effect to overturn
the Enmons result by treating the parties engaged in a labor dispute no
differently from other persons in terms of the applicable prohibitions
under this section, which is limited to extortionate means involving actual
or threatened violence.2 3 9
The Committee Report, however, also responded to the concern
expressed by the Enmons Court that minor acts of picket line vio-
lence might, but for a narrow reading of the statute, be elevated
into a federal felony. The report noted that
in the Committee's view such acts do not fall within the purview of the
Hobbs Act (nor should they be Federally punishable) since there is no
intent thereby to obtain the employer's property through the use of force
and the acts do not in fact cause the employer to part with his property in
short, such isolated acts of violence do not partake of the nature of extor-
tion.2 4 0
To insure that the Act would be construed in that fashion, the
proposed extortion provision contained an additional section spe-
cifically recognizing that "[i]t is an affirmative defense to a prose-
cution under subsection (a) (1) that the threatened or feared
injury or damage was minor and was incidental to peaceful picket-
ing or other concerted activity in the course of a bona fide labor
237. Id. at 9602.
238. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
239. Id. at 624-25.
240. Id. at 624.
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dispute." 241 Senator Kennedy, who introduced S. 1437 in the Sen-
ate, explained that "a defense is added to the extortion provision to
make it clear that minor incidents occuring in the course of legiti-
mate labor picketing are not punishable under the extortion stat-
ute.,,242
Immediately thereafter, however, Senator Kennedy introduced
an amendment to the extortion provision which deleted the "af-
firmative defense" section altogether and substituted the follow-
ing:
(b) PROOF.-In a prosecution under subsection (a) (1) in which the
threat or fear is based upon conduct by an agent or member of a labor
organization consisting of an act of bodily injury to a person or damage to
property, the pendency at the time of such conduct, of a labor dispute, as
defined in 29 U.S.C. 152(9), the outcome of which could result in the ob-
taining of employment benefits by the actor, does not constitute prima fa-
cie evidence that property was obtained 'by' such conduct.
2 43
In Senator Kennedy's view, the amendment simply clarified ex-
isting law, which, as he understood it, required proof not only of
acts of violence but also of the fact that the violence was done with
the intent of extorting. Beyond saying that and restating what the
amendment itself said directly,2 4 4 he offered no explanation.
Senator Thurmond's remarks, on the other hand, were consid-
erably more enlightening. In explaining his lack of objection to the
amendment, he noted that:
This amendment would add a "proof' subsection designed to prevent a
trial judge from holding that, in a case described in the new subsection,
mere proof that personal injury or property damage occurred during a la-
bor dispute constitutes a sufficient showing of the causal relationship be-
tween the obtaining of property and the threat of fear based on that injury
or damage to justify submission of that issue to the jury. It prevents such
a holding directly, by providing that proof of the coincidence of the labor
dispute and the injury or damage in such a case is not "Prima facie evi-
dence" of the causal relationship. It is true, of course, that such a causal
relationship sometimes does edst where injury or damage occurs during a
labor dispute. This proposed subsection, however, is based on the belief
that where there is a cause and effect relationship, or the intent to obtain
property by means of a threat or fear resulting from injury or damage, it
should be possible to prove, in addition to that coincidence, some other
circumstances adding to the strength of the inference of causation.
The proposed subsection does not address the question of which par-
ticular additional circumstance or circumstances, when proven along with
that coincidence, will suffice to justify the submission of the issue to the
jury. One which clearly would be sufficient in many cases to avoid a di-
rected verdict is the circumstance that the defendant was, or conspired
with, a person negotiating on behalf of the union involved in the labor dis-
pute. The same result might obtain, where the repetitive or systematic
241. Hearings, Part XIII, supra note 236, at 9602-03.
242. 124 CONG. REC. S12 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978).
243. Id. at S17.
244. Id. at S17-18.
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nature of property damage, or its exact timing, contributed to an infer-
ence, based also on the fact that a labor dispute was pending at the time
the damage was done, that the damage was purposeful rather than mind-
lessly vindictive.24
5
The amendment was adopted 246 and S. 1437 passed the Senate
on January 30, 1978;247 however, the bill was allowed to die in the
House.
Undaunted by this lack of prior success, Senator Kennedy, on
behalf of himself and several other Senators, reintroduced a pro-
posed recodification of the federal criminal laws246 in the Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722.249 As introduced, the extortion
provisions of this bill were identical to those as contained in S. 1437
as passed by the Senate.
Hearings were again held on this bill, and to at least some of the
representatives of management the extortion provisions of the bill
were apparently satisfactory. The published comments of the As-
sociated Builders and Contractors, Inc. noted, for example, that
the omission of the word "wrongful" in the Act properly eliminated
the "legitimate objectives" exception read into the Hobbs Act by
the Court in Enmons.250 Furthermore, the comment stated that,
properly construed, the "proof' provision was acceptable as well.
In their view, if the violence was something more than a minor and
unrelated incident, and the employer could testify "that there was
a direct connection between the violence and his decision to in-
crease benefits," 251 then the requirements of the section would be
satisfied and a prima facie case of violation made out.
For the most part representatives of organized labor agreed
with this interpretation of the proposed statute, and, for that rea-
son, were vehemently opposed to it. They objected to the overrul-
ing of the Enmons decision by elimination of the term "wrongful"
in the definition of extortion on many of the same policy grounds
that were advanced by the Court in that case. Witnesses cited nu-
merous reasons why Enmons should not be overruled: The danger
of making minor picket line misconduct a federal criminal felony;
the danger of overactive and politically ambitious prosectors using
this as an excuse to intrude unnecessarily into strike situations;
the resulting unwarranted incursion of federal jurisdiction into an
245. Id. at S17.
246. Id. at S18.
247. Id. at S860.
248. 125 CONG. REC. S12204 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979).
249. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws:
Hearings on S. 1722, S. 1723 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Part XIV, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11090-484 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings, Part XIV].




area traditionally left to the states; the disruption of the balance
already struck by Congress in the labor-management relations
area; the chilling effect upon the exercise by employees of other
federally protected rights; and the existence of other remedies for
labor violence.25 2
Moreover, the "proof" provision was regarded by labor as inade-
quate to guard against the evils that would result from making la-
bor activity generally subject to the statute. Thomas X. Dunn,
General Counsel for the Building and Construction Trades Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO, stated:
It is clear that section 1722(b) is designed to create an additional bur-
den of proof in prosecutions for misconduct which occurs in the course of
a labor-management dispute. The Government would be required to es-
tablish a nexus between the alleged misconduct and the obtaining of
otherwise legitimate employment benefits. As a practical matter, how-
ever, this burden of proof could be satisfied easily in almost every eco-
nomic strike where misconduct occurs. It appears that all that the
Government need do to satisfy its burden is present the employer in-
volved in the strike who will testify that the alleged violence or threat of
violence was a factor in his decision to agree to workers' demands for
higher wages or other employment benefit.
Thus, section 1722(b) would not be an effective means of discouraging
the Government from applying the proposed extortion statute to any mis-
conduct which occurs in the course of an economic strike.
2 5 3
Robert M. Baptiste, Counsel for the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, expressed a similar sentiment:
While the amendment was proposed in "recognition that tempers often
flare in labor disputes" and all strike-related misconduct should not be a
Federal criminal offense, we submit that the proof provisions can so easily
be satisfied that virtually all economic strikes where misconduct occurs
could be subject to this new Federal extortion penalty.2 5 4
Lance Compa, Washington Representative of the United Elec-
trical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, was fearful of the
undesireable consequences that could result if the interpretation
advanced by Senator Thurmond 255 was taken as controlling. He
stated:
Furthermore, Senator Thurmond offered a detailed interpretation of
the Kennedy Amendment that constitutes dangerous legislative history.
Senator Kennedy made no careful explanation of his amendment. Sena-
tor Thurmond said the proof requirement would not be necessary if the
defendant "was or conspired with" a union negotiator or if the damage
was "repetitive," "systematic" or "purposeful rather than mindlessly vin-
dictive."
Applying this interpretation would, first of all, chill any contact be-
tween a union negotiating committee and the rank and fe members. In-
252. Id. at 10045-48, 10691-92.
253. Id. at 10693.
254. Id. at 10049.
255. See note 245 & accompanying text supra.
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stead of keeping a firm hand on the strike-which is essential if the
committee is to be effective at the bargaining table-a committee will be
forced into a "hear no evil, see no evil" position, sequestered from the
membership in order to avoid possible prosecutions. Even so, a prosecu-
tor out to nail an aggressive union leader could frighten or entice with
promises of immunity a rank and file member to implicate the union offi-
cial in some damage.
Second, the 'purposeful rather than mindlessly vindictive" interpreta-
tion effectively removes any protection the Kennedy Amendment might
have provided, since any damage in a strike, misguided as it may be, is
connected to the purpose of winning the strike.2 s "
As drafted, the extortion provisions of S. 1722 represented a
compromise which could not be held together because of the
strong opposition of organized labor. This, however, opened the
door anew to the full range of possibilities including reaffirming
the Enmons approach in its entirety, on the one hand, or providing
no special exemptions for labor, on the other, as well as several
intermediate possibilities.
Eventually, a new compromise was hammered out. It was
agreed that the basic definition of the offense of extortion would
remain the same, but that the "proof' provision would be replaced
with a "bar to prosecution" provision; the "grading" and "jurisdic-
tion" provisions remained unchanged. In relevant part, the extor-
tion section, as finally approved and reported out by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, reads as follows:
§ 1722. EXTORTION.
(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains property
of another-
(1) by threatening or placing another person in fear that any per-
son will be subjected to bodily injury or kidnapping or that any prop-
erty will be damaged; or
(2) under color of official right.
(b) BAR TO PROSECUTION-It is a bar to prosecution under this
section that the offense occurred in connection with a labor dispute as de-
fined in 29 U.S.C. 152(9) to achieve legitimate collective bargaining objec-
tives, unless there is clear proof that the conduct which constitutes the
threat or placing in fear required under subsection (a) (1) consists of a
felony and the conduct was engaged in for the purpose of causing death or
severe bodily injury in order to secure such objectives; and the Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division certifies in writing that-
(A) the facts establish the existence of the additional elements of
the offense required under this subsection;
(B) a federal prosecution should be commenced under this sec-
tion; and
(C) the State is unable or unwilling to proceed with any
equivalent prosecution relating to 
such conduct.
2 5
256. Hearings, Part XIV, supra note 249, at 10764.
257. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (as reported with amendments).
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The Committee Report summarized the compromise in these
terms: "The Committee has concluded over the objection of a sub-
stantial minority that, except in the circumstances set forth in sub-
section (b) of section 1722, for the purposes of this bill the Enmons
decision should not be modified. ' 25 8 The Committee, in other
words, was willing to accept the Enmons proposition that the "le-
gitimacy" of a union's objective was sufficient to justify even the
use of physical violence to achieve it, at least in the sense of ren-
dering the violence not illegal under federal law. "On the other
hand, the Committee believes that the thrust of an extortion stat-
ute should be to punish violent extortionate means to obtain the
property of another regardless of the legality of the ends sought
and has carried forward current law to that effect in situations not
involving a labor dispute. '259
That is what the proposed statute says, but what it means is
another matter. For example, S. 1722 does nothing to clarify the
two main ambiguities of the existing case law. By carrying forward
the Enmons rationale of "legitimate" union objectives, the pro-
posed statute also carries forward the ambiguities associated with
that rationale.260 Furthermore, the Committee Report on the bill
does nothing to clarify the ambiguity. At one point the report
notes that the Committee intended to reaffirm the Enmons princi-
ple "to the effect that labor officials were not covered for their ex-
tortionate activities against employers in the course of a labor
dispute, if the objective sought was a permissible goal of collective
bargaining.'2 61 Similarly, in discussing the meaning of the phrase
"legitimate collective bargaining objectives," the Committee Re-
port notes that this "encompasses activities to secure non-corrupt
labor union objectives even if, as in Enmons, those activities would
violate other laws and excludes such objectives as efforts to obtain
personal payoffs or payments for superfluous services. '262
The difficulty, as with the Enmons decision itself, is in fitting
the Green facts into such a formulation. Although the objective
sought in Green was certainly to obtain "payments for superfluous
services," in the colloquial sense, as a legal matter the objective
was both "non-corrupt" and "a permissible goal of collective bar-
gaining"; yet a violation was found to exist in that case, undoubt-
edly because of the presence of violence. The Committee, like the
Court in Enmons, obviously did not intend to overrule Green.
However, since the presence of violence is no longer a sufficient
258. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 645 (1980).
259. Id.
260. See § Il-C of text supra.
261. S. REP. No. 533, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 649 (1980) (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
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condition for a violation, the reconciliation of results of Green with
the wording of the proposed statute is somewhat less than obvious.
With respect to the second major ambiguity, the Committee Re-
port does make it clear that the damage to property referred to in
the definition of extortion includes only physical damage to prop-
erty and does not include mere economic loss or injury. Those
kinds of Hobbs Act injuries were, the Committee Report notes, in-
tended to be covered by the proposed section on blackmail rather
than the extortion section.263 Section 1723 provides that "a person
is guilty of an offense [of blackmail] if he obtains property of an-
other by threatening or placing another person in fear that any
person will ... (4) improperly subject any person to economic loss
or injury to his business or profession .... ,,26 The Committee
Report comments that
[t]his carries forward... the present reach of the Hobbs Act,. . . as in-
terpreted by judicial decisions. It is designed to make clear that this sec-
tion does not reach legitimate activity, such as strikes, boycotts, or
picketing activity undertaken in support of such objectives as increased
wages or improved working conditions for employees.
2 6 5
The significance of this language should be readily apparent.
The word "improperly," as used in the proposed section on black-
mail, is obviously intended to have the same connotation as the
word "wrongful" contained in the Hobbs Act and construed by the
Supreme Court. This means that the objective must be an "illegiti-
mate" one. So construed, the blackmail section ties in nicely with
the extortion section. If the objective being sought is other than a
"legitimate" one, the extortion section is relevant if the "means"
involve threats of physical damage to person or property, but if the
"means" involve mere threats of economic injury, the blackmail
section is relevant.
With respect to the latter, an unduly broad definition of "illegiti-
mate" (i.e., broad enough to encompass the objective sought by
the union in Green) would create some difficult problems. It is
highly unlikely that the Committee intended to include within the
offense of blackmail a union's peaceful picketing to cause an em-
ployer to add jobs which he considers unnecessary or superfluous.
However, the ambiguities inherent in the central concept of the
two sections-namely, the fuzzy notion of "legitimate" versus '"lle-
gitimate" ends-makes the statute, in theory at least, susceptible
to that construction.
To summarize: If, under the extortion section, the union's ob-
jective is other than a "legitimate" one, whatever that means, it is
263. Id. at 648 n.58.
264. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (as reported with amendments).
265. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 657 (1980) (footnote omitted).
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not covered by the bar under subsection (b) and a prosecution can
commence under the main provisions of the section. 266 On the
other hand, even if the union is attempting to achieve "legitimate
collective bargaining objectives, '267 the use of force to that end can
still be considered extortion if the requirements spelled out in the
"unless" clause of subsection (b) are all met. With respect to
these, the Committee Report, which presumably represents an au-
thoritative interpretation of the language, deserves to be quoted in
full, because it adds things which are certainly not apparent on the
face of the language itself:
The exception to the bar stated in subsection (b) is intended to spell
out the exclusive circumstances which may give rise to a Federal extor-
tion prosecution involving unlawful conduct that occurs during a labor dis-
pute to achieve legitimate collective bargaining objectives. In essence this
exception adds two elements to the crime. First, the government must
prove that the defendant engaged in conduct against the person which, if
there were Federal jurisdiction, would be a felony under the code. This
element requires an act and not a mere statement or threat to act. Sec-
ond, the government must prove that the defendant acted not merely
"knowingly" as that term is used in the code but with the preestablished
intent to (a) cause death or severe bodily injury, and (b) by so doing to
force acceptance of the union's demands. "Severe bodily injury" means
protracted disabling or disfiguring bodily injury that precludes the individ-
ual from gainfully working.
The phrase "clear proof," which has its origin in Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. Section 106), as used here imposes on the gov-
ernment the obligation to establish by direct evidence that the conduct
against the person included in the exception was undertaken for the pur-
pose specified therein. Without such proof, violence, no matter how seri-
ous, during a labor dispute is outside the Federal extortion law.
In order to reinforce traditional principles of federalism the bar is not
overcome (and the Federal government may not initiate an investigation
or prosecution of the illegal conduct) unless the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division
certifies in writing that (a) the facts establish the existence of the addi-
tional elements of the offense required by the exception to the bar; (b) a
Federal prosecution should be commenced under this section; and (c) for
reasons other than insufficient evidence the State refuses to proceed with
a prosecution relating to the conduct against the person specified in the
exception to the bar. Such a certification must be based on evidence ob-
tained by or available to the State prior to the Federal government's in-
volvement in the matter; however, once the certification is made, this
provision does not limit the Federal government's ability to secure and
rely on additional evidence.
2 6 8
Construed in this fashion, it would appear that section 1722
would result in federal prosecution of violence in connection with
collective bargaining only in the rarest of situations. The "clear
proof' standard has, for example, been a difficult one to meet in
266. See text accompanying note 257 supra.
267. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
268. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 651-52 (1980).
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Norris-LaGuardia cases, and one could expect it to be a popular
and successful ground of defense under the proposed extortion
section as well. Similarly, the limits on federal initiation of inves-
tigations and prosecutions under the extortion section, as sug-
gested by the Committee Report, would severely hamstring the
enforcement of the statute. The exclusion of threats to cause prop-
erty damage and the definition of "severe bodily injury" in terms of
'"protracted disabling or disfiguring bodily injury that precludes
the individual from gainfully working"2 69 further limits the circum-
stances under which the section could be applied to labor violence.
Moreover, insuIficiency of the evidence as a basis for non-prosecu-
tion by the state is not, according to the Committee Report, suffi-
cient to permit federal involvement, an ironic limitation since the
state's lack of sufficient evidence may well be attributable to its
inability to effectively investigate a crime having interstate dimen-
sions. Finally, the requirement of what amounts to an affirmative
recommendation from someone at the highest levels of the Justice
Department that a prosecution be commenced seems to create al-
most a presumption against prosecution, immediately makes the
decision a politically sensitive one, and also suggests that the dis-
cretion involved there is somewhat broader than that which would
exist otherwise. Nevertheless, the Criminal Code Reform Act of
1979, S. 1722, containing the extortion provision thus described,
was reported out favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and is currently pending before the full Senate.
Although most of the attention was initially focused on the Sen-
ate committee hearings, the House of Representatives was at this
time also quietly proceeding on the matter of revising and recodi-
fying the federal criminal laws. The Brown Commission draft it-
self was, for example, introduced in the House as H.R. 300,270 but
no hearings were ever held on it. As the reforms began to solidify
in S. 1 and S. 1400, "liberal" representatives, alarmed at the direc-
tion the legislation was taking, introduced their own proposed code
of federal criminal laws, H.R. 10850271 in 1975 and H.R. 12504272 in
1976. One commentator has called these "belated and hastily
drafted alternatives ' 273 to S. 1, and they do not really warrant any
detailed analysis.
The first proposal to receive serious consideration by the House
was H.R. 6869.274 This was the so-called "companion bill" to S. 1437
269. Id. at 651.
270. H.R. 300, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
271. M-R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
272. H.R. 12504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
273. Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Pros-
pects, 41 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 12 (1977).
274. H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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which omitted the term "wrongful" (thus overruling Enmons) and
provided an affirmative defense if the threatened injury was "mi-
nor and incidental to peaceful picketing."275 Organized labor was
not, however, happy with the wording of this defense. Lance
Compa, Washington Representative of the United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, stated that:
H.R. 6869 provides a defense, not a bar to prosecution, that the
threatened or feared injury or damage was "minor" and "incidental" to a
"bona fide labor dispute." Each of these terms is dangerously unclear.
How much damage is minor? What is incidental? Who determines
whether there is a bona fide labor dispute? Suppose, for example, what an
employer labels a "wildcat" strike is later found by the NLRB to be pro-
tected Unfair Labor Practice strike? Where would this leave a prosecution
based on the "bona fide" requirement?2 76
The bill was never reported out of committee. That year, how-
ever, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice did report H.R.
13959277 to the House Committee on the Judiciary. This bill was
designed merely to reorganize the federal criminal laws, but not, at
that point in time, to change their substance. Thus, it carried for-
ward the law as construed by the Court in Enmons.
The next proposed revision to the federal criminal laws ap-
peared in the form of H.R. 6233.278 As introduced, section 2522 of
this bill provided, with respect to the extortion offense that:
(a) Whoever knowingly threatens or places another person in fear that-
(1) any person will be subjected to bodily injury or kidnapping; or
(2) that any property will be damaged; and thereby obtains prop-
erty of another, or attempts to do so, commits a class C felony.
(b) It is not a defense to a prosecution for an offense under this section
that the conduct constituting the offense was in furtherance of a legitimate
objective or activity.2 7 9
Subsection (b) obviously makes express what the omission of the
term "wrongfully" in subsection (a) leaves only implicit-namely,
that the Enmons approach was to be repudiated in its entirety.
However, when H.R. 6233 was later reintroduced as H.R. 6915,280
the extortion provision had been changed by the insertion of the
term "wrongfully" before the term "obtains" in subsection (a),
thus making subsection (a) directly contradictory to the language
in subsection (b). Apparently, the legal and logical effect of that
was to reaffirm the "legitimate objectives" defense of Enmons.28 1
275. Id.
276. Hearings, Part XIV, supra note 249, at 10763.
277. H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
278. HL 6233, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). A "working draft" of this bill was also
introduced in the Senate as S. 1723, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), but with sub-
section (b) omitted.
279. Id.
280. HL.R 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
281. One logical, but somewhat unlikely explanation, of this draft was that it made
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The resolution to that conundrum ultimately adopted by the
House Judiciary Committee was simply to delete subparagraph
(b), thus apparently leaving the law exactly as it is under Enmons.
In this form, H.R. 6915 has been reported out of committee and
is currently pending before the House of Representatives.
Whether this bill, the Senate version, some compromise worked
out by a Senate-House Conference Committee, or no bill at all is to
be passed is, of course, purely a matter of conjecture.
V. CONCLUSION
The response of the federal extortion laws to the problem of la-
bor union violence does not reflect favorably on the state of Ameri-
can jurisprudence in three broad respects. First, as a matter of
judicial process, serious questions can be raised about the way the
courts have handled the extortion statutes. The Local 807 case
was poorly reasoned, and both the majority opinion and the dis-
sent leave the scope of the statute somewhat obscure. The "legiti-
mate objectives" rationale of the Enmons decision is not only
inconsistent with the prior Green decision, thus creating a yet un-
resolved ambiguity in the statute, but also ignores the overwhelm-
ing evidence of a contrary legislative intent. The reasoning in the
opinion is weak in other respects as well, and one must share Mr.
Justice Douglas's suspicion that the Court's own predelictions
about labor policy played a more instrumental role in the decision
than the traditional tenets of statutory construction, thus creating,
as he also recognized, serious separation-of-powers problems.282
Specifically, it would appear that the Court used the judicial proc-
ess to achieve a political result that probably could not have been
achieved by the legislative process and which, as indicated by the
current status of pending legislation, probably cannot now be re-
versed by the legislative process.283
In addition, as a matter of legislative process, the manner in
which Congress has responded to the problem leaves much to be
"legitimate objectives" a defense in all cases except those involving labor ex-
tortion, thus turning on its head the uniquely favored treatment afforded la-
bor unions by the Enmons decision.
282. Mr. Justice Douglas noted that "[w]hile we said in ... [case citation omit-
ted] that it is 'retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves
the stigma of judicial legislation,' the same is true of retrospective contraction
of meaning." 410 U.S. at 419 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
283. The Enmons decision is, of course, only one example of this rather curious
phenomenon. For an insightful analysis of the underlying constitutional
(separation of powers) problems posed by this particular use, or abuse, of the
judicial process, see Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Redistributing Injustice:
A Critical View of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and the Mis-
guided Policy of Numerical Employment, 21 B.C. L Rev. 1 (1980).
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desired. Although a relatively clear legislative intent can, on some
critical points at least, be distilled from the Hobbs Act debates,
they do make for agonizing reading for they are often rambling,
obscure, filled with many irrelevancies, and in general reflect the
lack of a clear understanding of finer nuances of the matter under
discussion. Furthermore, the statutory draftsmanship is frequent-
ly flawed. The use of the word "wrongful" in the Hobbs Act with-
out a clear indication of what was intended and the ambiguous
words and phrases of much of the pending legislation serve only as
an invitation to judicial license.
Finally, at a substantive level, the Enmons creation of a doctri-
nal exception applicable only to the agents of organized labor, and
the currently pending legislation, which, in whole or in part, per-
petuates that policy of favored treatment, raise serious and far
reaching questions about the quality and the equality of federal
criminal justice in this country. Congressman Hobbs said of the
Hobbs Act that "[t] his bill is grounded on the bedrock principle
that crime is crime, no matter who commits it; and that robbery is
robbery and extortion extortion, whether or not the perpetrator
has a union card. '284 The view today, however, is that this is not
necessarily so. Instead, the prevailing view seems to be that crimi-
nality under federal law is as much a matter of the actor's status as
it is of his conduct, and that the status of a labor union official is an
especially privileged one in our society.
Admittedly, state law remedies may still be available for labor
violence falling within the Enmons exception. Furthermore, even
an intelligently drafted and impartially construed federal extortion
statute may not be the cure-all for labor violence, since much of it
does not have extortionate objectives, proof problems will always
be somewhat more difficult with respect to this particular form of
violent crime, and limited federal resouces may sometimes call for
selective enforcement, thus still leaving the bulk of the responsi-
bility for combating this evil to other sources of law. However,
given the almost universal agreement that labor violence, even
when aimed at otherwise legitimate ends, is to be deplored, there
are no sound reasons why such violence should not be covered by
a federal extortion statute of general application. The deterrent ef-
fect alone would be of immense value in promoting a central policy
of federal labor law-namely, the encouragement of collective bar-
gaining, reasoned persuasion, and the peaceful use of economic
power. To that end the Enmons decision should be overruled, ei-
ther by the Court itself after a more reflective review of the legisla-
tive history, or by Congress.
284. 89 CONG. REc. 3217 (1943).
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